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Abstract
This thesis evaluates Canada‘s compliance with human rights-based complementary
international protection. Through an analysis of the roots of international refugee
protection, it first links the evolution of the latter with the development of human rights
law instruments. It then defines complementary protection as the corpus of legal bases for
asylum claims outside of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It uses
various human rights instruments to outline international protection obligations, which
take three different forms of complementary protection. The first one consists in
independent protection mechanisms outside of the Refugee Convention, the most
important being the formulation of non-refoulement in the Convention Against Torture.
The others are rights that expand the application of existing protection mechanisms, and
protection mechanisms established by the UNHCR outside of existing international
treaties. This thesis argues that Canada‘s application of these norms reflects partial
compliance with its obligations, as it acknowledges important humanitarian concerns
regarding international protection, while attempting to preserve its prerogative to exclude
individuals based on national security.

vii

Acknowledgments
This thesis could not have been successfully completed without the continuous feedback
and guidance I have received from Professor Constance MacIntosh. I am grateful for your
insight, your patience and your commitment. From the choice of topic to the final
modifications in my thesis draft, your advice has helped me immensely.
I would like to thank my parents, Ewa and Stanislaw Przybytkowski, for their continued
moral and financial support, as well as my brothers Andrew and Karol for believing in
me. Dziękuję.
Finally, I thank Professor Richard Devlin for welcoming me into this program and
helping me gain confidence in my scholarly abilities, and Michelle Kirkwood for her
oversight and assistance.
I thank you all for making this year a truly enriching experience.

viii

1.1.1. Introduction
This thesis is about how the evolution of international protection mechanisms, in light of
the development of international human rights law, affects the Canadian asylum system.
The main inquiry of this thesis is the extent to which the adoption of international human
rights treaties has had an impact on obligations created by the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)1, and how these obligations have been
implemented in Canadian law.
This thesis seeks to answer this question by exploring three different phenomena. Firstly,
it considers how the evolution of international protection has resulted in the creation of
so-called ―complementary protection‖ mechanisms, which are new and separate sources
of protection. This thesis also explores how international treaties that are not directly
focused on international protection, but on international human rights, affect and expand
the interpretation of existing protection mechanisms. Thirdly, this inquiry is completed
by a brief exploration of less formal sources of protection that lie in the United Nations
bodies‘ mandate and activities.
These three types of developments in international law result in obligations for states that
are parties to the concerned conventions and member states of the United Nations, of
which Canada is a part. The protection mechanisms offered by Canada are essentially
reflected in the recently reformed Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)2,
which now expands protection beyond the obligations created in the Refugee Convention.
Hence, my research is directed at determining how and to what extent IRPA‘s expansion

1

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force 22
April 1954, accession by Canada 4 June 1969) [Refugee Convention].
2
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. I-25 [IRPA].
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of protection to asylum-seekers reflects compliance with international human rights law
instruments and the renewed international protection system they create. I include within
the scope of my analysis of human rights law, the prohibition of torture and the protection
of civil and political rights, the protection of social, economic and cultural rights, as well
as human rights specific to children and women.
Because this thesis juggles with a variety of new and old concepts, the first chapter is
aimed at setting up the theoretical background and the framework for the analysis of
complementary protection sources. Complementary international protection can be
understood as having similar characteristics as refugee protection while being separate
from it. The formal sources of the international refugee law regime are thus a benchmark
for the evaluation of complementary protection sources. I introduce my analysis by
delving briefly into the history of asylum and international protection and finding clues as
to how it has shaped the formation of the international refugee law regime and more
specifically the drafting of the Refugee Convention.
I will begin this historical overview by looking into the first manifestations of protection
granted to foreign nationals and their significance in the definition of the nature of
international protection duties. This will reveal that the idea of shelter from persecution
stems from historic state practice, and that modern asylum mechanisms draw inspiration
from the norm of granting diplomatic asylum. This analysis will flow into how the UN‘s
predecessor, the League of Nations, was the first to create an international protection
regime through binding international treaties. These treaties show awareness of the need
for an international response to growing numbers of individuals fleeing persecution,
though they were also punctual responses to specific conflicts or situations of exodus.

2

The first universal protection regime came along with the 1951 Refugee Convention,
drafted under the auspices of the UN. Using the travaux préparatoires of the Convention
and the debates between member states they contain, I argue that the Convention
definition of refugee3 represented a compromise between two positions. The first is that
international protection requires a generous definition that opens up to new and
unpredicted protection needs as part of a humanitarian objective, and the second position
affirms that the definition should be precise, but allow for modifications as new
protection needs arise. This demonstrates a recognition that international protection
should intervene when states are unable to protect individuals from persecution. My
analysis then follows the subsequent evolution of international protection through a failed
attempt at drafting a UN Convention on Territorial Asylum, followed by recognition of
the effect of the development of human rights instruments on refugees‘ and asylum
seekers‘ rights.
Using the insight gained through the historical context of asylum, I will move on to
propose a definition of protection in a legal sense, based on what protection means within
the Refugee Convention. This will help to set states‘ duties of protection against the role
of international protection. These different levels of protection will allow me to pinpoint
the type of international protection that can be qualified as complementary. I suggest that
complementary international protection includes all types of protection outside of that
offered by the state of nationality and the formal well-established international protection
regime created by the Refugee Convention. I will also justify the qualification of
alternative protection for forms of domestic implementation of complementary

3

Article 1(A)2 Refugee Convention.

3

international protection. Since this idea of protection refers to the respect and fulfilment
of human rights, I will continue Chapter 2 with a discussion of the connection between
international human rights law and international refugee protection in order to further
support the use of human rights law for expanding international protection. This
discussion will be completed by a reflection on the nature of the state‘s duty to protect
human rights, which will be based on Fredman‘s theory of human rights as generating
positive duties4.
The last section of chapter 2 is dedicated to a brief review of the legal basis for the
existence of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its
mandate, which has grown to be more inclusive and far-reaching than the Refugee
Convention. I demonstrate that even if it is a weaker source of obligations for member
states, it has become a standard-setting organization, and its Executive Committee has
been instrumental in the interpretation of states‘ international protection obligations,
including complementary international protection. The UNHCR has a mandate flexible
enough to adopt various assistance initiatives for displaced persons, which are often
subsequently validated by the UN General Assembly. Although it does not originate in a
treaty, I argue that the UNHCR benefits from support by much of the international
community and, as such, may be considered a source of complementary protection. I
further note that Canada has generally collaborated with the UNHCR by providing
resettlement to protected persons abroad.

4

Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
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In Chapter 3, I will analyze non-refoulement, the principle that garners the most scholarly
and state support5 as a complementary protection mechanism. Non-refoulement refers to
the right not to be returned to a country where one faces a risk to life or a risk of torture
or cruel, unusual or inhuman treatment or punishment. This principle was already stated
in the Refugee Convention, but it emerged as a complementary protection mechanism
with the Convention Against Torture (CAT)6, and is a corollary of the prohibition of
torture itself. I will therefore open the chapter with a general overview of the roots of the
prohibition of torture and I will explain its qualification as a jus cogens norm. I will also
explain the state duties that come along with the right not to be subjected to torture in
light of Fredman‘s theory of human rights.
I will then expand on the principle of non-refoulement itself by providing a definition and
a discussion of its scope. This will allow me to explain its qualification as a mechanism
of complementary international protection, and to argue that as outlined in the CAT, it
becomes a mechanism for international protection by obligating states to create
alternative protection mechanisms on the domestic level. The scope of non-refoulement
inevitably leads to a debate on its peremptory nature. I will also go into a discussion of
exceptions to the principle created in the Refugee Convention and in state practice, in an
attempt to reconcile them with the absolute prohibition of refoulement created by the
CAT.

5

Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007); Ruma Mandal, ―Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (―Complementary
Protection‖)‖ (June 2005) Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA/2005/02 (UNHCR,
Department of International Protection).
6
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10
December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987, accession by Canada 24 June 1987)
[CAT].
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My analysis of the principle of non-refoulement under international law will form the
framework for an evaluation of Canada‘s implementation of this principle through the
alternative protection mechanism for ―persons in need of protection‖ in section 97 of
IRPA. This provision has been swiftly qualified as an expression of non-refoulement and
an implementation of art. 3 CAT7, which prohibits the return to torture, but I propose to
examine it in further detail and suggest that this affirmation is only partially true. I argue
that this section both widens the scope of non-refoulement as expressed in the CAT,
while including exceptions to the principle that are incompatible with international law.
Following a dissection of the text of the IRPA itself, I will look into how the principle of
non-refoulement was defined and applied within case law, in order to demonstrate
Courts‘ tendency to reconcile the imperfections in the legislation with the rules of
international law, instead of reassessing its validity in light of Canada‘s obligations.
Chapter 4 will be concerned with rights that are relevant to refugees contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)8 and with how they expand
the scope of complementary international protection mechanisms. More specifically, I
will discuss how the formulation of non-refoulement in the ICCPR widens the scope of
the principle as well as the role of this expansion within complementary protection. My
argument is that it specifies the nature and scope of the obligation to create an alternative
protection mechanism to guarantee non-refoulement on the domestic level. I further argue
that the ICCPR, through its articles relating to alien rights and non-discrimination, creates
procedural safeguards and guarantees access to state territory for foreign nationals fleeing
persecution. The overview of regional instruments that follows will show that they make
7

McAdam, supra note 5 at 129-130; Mandal, supra note 5 ¶ 194-202.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into
force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR].
8
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the principles embodied in the ICCPR more explicit and specifically applicable to
persons outside of the Convention definition, and they reaffirm international protection as
a humanitarian concern.
The second section of chapter 4 will be dedicated to an analysis of the application of the
ICCPR within Canadian case law, particularly in relation to the protection of the rights
contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)9 for asylum-seekers
and refugees. It will also deal with the implementation of ICCPR rights within the IRPA.
Through this analysis, I will show how the IRPA should be interpreted according to
instruments such as the ICCPR and according to humanitarian considerations.
I will also aim to demonstrate that the ICCPR‘s treatment by courts reflects a propensity
to interpret Canadian law as consistent with international treaties to which Canada is a
party, regardless of whether they are directly applied in the legislation. Finally, chapter 4
will look into the effect of the procedural safeguards and territorial access that are
guaranteed by the ICCPR, and it will demonstrate how the Canadian asylum system
limits access to the country‘s territory without proper weighing of competing rights in
accordance with international human rights principles.
In chapter 5, I apply a similar methodology to an analysis of social, economic and
cultural rights within the Refugee Convention, and within the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)10. My research regarding this
instrument will show that socio-economic and cultural rights are more valued and
respected by states when it comes to settlement, or once an individual is recognized as a
9

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
10
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force 3 January 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICESCR].
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refugee. In terms of the possibility of claiming protection based on a violation or denial
of a social, economic or cultural right, my analysis will reveal that states only have the
obligation to grant protection when the violation amounts to persecution under the
Refugee Convention, or when it constitutes cruel, inhuman or unusual treatment or
punishment.
I will also extend my research on socio-economic rights to situations where the
development of complementary modes of protection would seem appropriate, such as
displacement caused by climate change and natural disasters, the inability to obtain
adequate health care, and the longer-term persecutory effects of discrimination in
education.
My argument is that victims of natural disasters are only protected by international treaty
law in cases where they also suffer persecution due to one of the Convention grounds as a
result of the instability created by the disaster. Other individuals have to rely on the
UNHCR and other organizations who provide assistance initiatives. Individuals deprived
of appropriate health care may only be protected if they are being denied health care as a
means of persecution for one of the five enumerated reasons in the Refugee Convention.
As for education, it is only vaguely mentioned in the UNHCR‘s interpretation of
persecution under the Refugee Convention, from which it is difficult to conclude that a
state obligation to protect exists. These arguments will allow me to demonstrate that
Canada has extended the scope of the existing protection mechanisms it offers to persons
being denied socio-economic rights beyond that required by the Refugee Convention, and
awards refugee or protected person status to such individuals.

8

Chapter 6 will serve to demonstrate that an individual‘s personal status or belonging to a
family may influence the application of the refugee protection regime. I will examine
how the importance of family unity may affect individual claims or deportation orders
and serve to extend protection to some individuals who would otherwise be denied
protection. I will show that it has some impact, but it is stronger when tied to the respect
of the best interests of the child. Claims that would have been rejected may be reversed
only because the best interests of the child are given considerable weight in international
law, and within the Canadian refugee protection regime.
I will end chapter 6 by briefly looking into the impact that gender and sex have on the
interpretation of the Refugee Convention definition, and how it affects the assessment of
risk and persecution based on the five enumerated grounds, where female claimants are
concerned. I will focus at greater length on persecution against members of a particular
social group, and argue that women in general, as well as subgroups of women, may be
considered as particular social groups when they are subject to different treatment based
on sex, but that considerations related to gender are still inconsistently applied. I will use
the guidelines issued by the UNHCR as the main source for the interpretation of the
Convention in regard to women‘s rights, and will present a few examples of how they
have been integrated into Canadian case law.
Based on this research, this thesis will argue that Canada has only partially complied with
its international obligations regarding complementary protection in light of international
human rights law. Despite the integration of the prohibition of torture and nonrefoulement within the IRPA, the Act contains possibilities for exclusion that are
irreconcilable with Canada‘s international obligations. I would suggest that when it

9

comes to new protection mechanisms that are separate from the Refugee Convention,
Canada is reluctant to fully commit to the relatively new protection obligations set out by
the CAT. The Canadian protection system appears more open to a logical and reasonable
expansion via the interpretation of the Refugee Convention by general human rights
instruments. I will show that where the obligations are clearly set out by the UNHCR‘s
interpretations of international human rights law, Canada is willing to comply, but where
there is debate, uncertainty or contradiction, Canadian legislation tends to opt for the
minimal obligation. Finally, my analysis of the UNHCR mandate will reveal that Canada,
nonetheless, upholds the humanitarian tradition of international protection by cooperating
with the UNHCR‘s initiatives.

10

Chapter 2.

The Refugee Concept Revisited

This chapter sets up the theoretical framework of my thesis. In order to gain insight into
the duties related to international protection, I begin with an overview of the roots of
asylum. This allows for a better grasp of the evolution of various mechanisms of
international protection into an international refugee law regime, and for a better
understanding of how the concept of protection was perceived by states when creating
protection mechanisms. It also reveals hints that the international protection regime was
designed in tandem with the creation of an international human rights law regime. I draw
upon this historical inquiry to establish a working definition of protection through the
distinctions between state protection, international protection, and complementary
protection.
Next, since the connection between refugee law and human rights law is a fundamental
element of complementary protection, I dedicate a section of this chapter to human rights
theory and to the state duties attached to the protection of human rights. I conclude this
chapter with a brief analysis of the UNHCR‘s mandate, the significance of its evolution
and expansion, and the impact it has on member states.
2.1.Historical Evolution of Protection
2.1.1. Early History of Asylum and Refugee Protection
A brief history of the roots of asylum and refugee protection will reveal how the
association between asylum and persecution emerged. It might also help in building an
understanding of the language that surrounds international refugee protection and
complementary protection. Despite the lack of treaties or agreements specific to refugees
or asylum seekers before the 20th century, it has been recognized, through the

11

development of international aliens law, that aliens11 were a vulnerable group that found
itself at the mercy of the sovereign state12.
The first agreements between European states with regards to aliens were concerned with
foreign traders. These were concluded during the sixteenth century to grant protection to
such traders through the guarantee of safe border-crossing and basic civil rights13. It was
relatively easy for traders and migrants to acquire such rights and benefit from a freedom
of international movement14. It is suggested that at the time, no further generalized
protection was necessary for migrants, as states harboured hardly any concern for the
preservation and integrity of the nation state, and perceived immigration as beneficial for
society15.
Another source of modern refugee law lies in the protection offered to fugitives against
unjust punishment for political offences, and how it morphed from a defence from
extradition to a defence from deportation as states began to protect and close their
borders16. From this, ―[it] followed that, if asylum‘s historical purpose was to be served
in a world of closed borders, asylum needed to be made available to all those who were
persecuted and who would otherwise be excluded or deported, and not merely those who
were actually sought for extradition‖17. The purpose of the persecution requirement, in
turn, was ―to distinguish between refugees deserving of asylum on the one hand, and

11

New Oxford American Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. ―alien‖: ―belonging to a foreign country or nation‖.
James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under international law (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) at 79 [Hathaway, Rights of Refugees].
13
Ibid. at 76.
14
James C. Hathaway, The law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at 1 [Hathaway, Refugee
Status].
15
Ibid.
16
Matthew E. Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose and Limits (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009) at 52.
17
Ibid.
12

12

ordinary migrants excluded by the new immigration restriction on the other hand‖18.
From the outset, this served as a basis for the consideration of asylum as the state offering
a safe haven, a protection from being sent back to one‘s country of origin. It was not a
legal status, although it may have been attached to one, as it referred to the general idea
of protection from deportation. It hence becomes relevant to refer to persons seeking
protection in the wider sense as asylum-seekers, and to view asylum as protection offered
by a state including but not limited to refugee protection.
Historical inquiries generally reveal that the idea of criteria for immigration or refugee
status determination were modern twentieth century concerns that went hand in hand with
the emergence of the international human rights law regime and the growing importance
of state sovereignty19. This idea of the nation state was arguably tainted by a mentality of
preservation of ethnic identity and discrimination, possibly fuelled by the development of
means of transportation20.
The roots of the international refugee law doctrine as we know it appear to stem from
diplomatic asylum21. This type of asylum mainly refers to ambassadors and other people
escaping the jurisdiction of a country while dwelling on its territory. Nevertheless, its
history reveals a number of situations where embassies granted asylum to people who
had committed political crimes. In a number of these cases, such as that of a Danish
dignitary granting refuge to Spanish people sought for political reasons in 184322,
diplomatic asylum was not used merely by states to provide an extraterritorial refuge for
18

Ibid.
Ibid.
20
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of Persons Between States (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978) at 91.
21
UN General Assembly, Question of Diplomatic Asylum: Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR,
30th Sess., UN Doc. A/10139 (Part II) (1975).
22
Ibid. ¶ 10.
19
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their own citizens. Although it may have started out this way during the sixteenth
century23, it was increasingly used as protection for political activists during periods of
political instability.
The rules for diplomatic asylum reflected similar concerns to those of modern asylum
mechanisms, through their rejection of perpetrators of crime and inclusion of individuals
who were persecuted for political reasons24. This suggests that as nations ventured into
the development of a doctrine of protection, they may have drawn some inspiration from
the evolution of the doctrine of diplomatic asylum as a means for a state to grant
protection to persons who seek it within its jurisdiction, a situation equivalent to the
granting of refugee status or complementary protection today. It also demonstrates early
signs of awareness that a person may find himself to be the victim of persecution by his
own state or unable to benefit from state protection. In other words, there was recognition
that a person could legitimately seek refuge in another nation‘s territory if her basic
freedoms were threatened in her country of nationality or residence.
2.1.2. Refugee Protection under the League of Nations
As the first international organization with a universal and far reaching mandate, the
League of Nations established the first international treaties granting refugee protection.
In the early agreements of the League of Nations during the 1920s, this protection was
translated into punctual measures and arrangements regarding specific groups of people
who no longer benefited from any state protection25. These agreements targeted particular

23

Ibid. ¶ 2.
Ibid. ¶ 13; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996) at 117-118 [Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee].
25
Arrangement With Regard to the Issue of Certificates to Russian Refugees, 5 July 1922, 13 L.N.T.S. No.
355; Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, 12 May
24

14

groups of people who were victims of political occurrences of the time and whose status
became unclear as a result of political turmoil and war26. They defined refugees
according to specific ethnic or national origin and lack of protection from the state 27. The
personal status of these refugees remained to be determined by the state that agreed to
afford them protection28.
Refugee status determination within the framework of the League of Nations was,
therefore, not a measure generally applicable to individual migrants fleeing their country,
but only to specific situations of mass exodus. At the time, refugee status was a quite
uncommon response to new and anomalous situations29. In the case of the Germans in the
1930s, a new agreement was created for their inclusion in the international refugee
protection regime30, but this time, recognizing their need for protection as political
dissidents31. This further suggests that the League of Nations regime was merely a series
of responses to punctual protection needs. One could say that a similar logic directs the
creation of complementary modes of protection today, as they are responses to new
situations unaccounted for by current protection regimes.
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Nonetheless, a few stateless people straying into a sovereign country would have been of
little interest to the burgeoning international community. The treaties were deemed
necessary because of the massive displacement of persons, which put the member states
at risk of social disorder and possible loss of control over immigration32. Also, the
political views of displaced persons were not relevant in the determination of their status
until the 1930s, nor was any individual characteristic other than ethnic origin 33. As the
original belief was that the need for refugee protection would subside, no general
instrument was implemented.
Before the 1930s, the protection system devised by the League of Nations remained
essentially based on groups from specific ethnic origins chosen in an arbitrary way that
was coloured by the politics of the countries of refuge34. This resulted in the existence of
large groups of people who had lost their nationality, but who did not fall under any of
the agreements granting refugee status35. These smaller groups finding themselves in a
similar situation to that of Armenian and Russian refugees include Turks in Greece, Jews
in Romania, and Hungarians dispersed through Austria, France and Romania36.
The evolution of the world economy during the 1930s, combined with the realization that
refugees would not, or, at least, not immediately, return to their country of origin, led to
the adoption of the 1938 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees
which granted refugees socio-economic rights in terms of labour, welfare and education
in the country of refuge37. This treaty is seen to be one of the earliest manifestations of a
32
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legally binding human rights protection regime38, and it foreshadows the continuing
interconnectivity between international human rights law and the law of refugee status.
Further, it allowed states to extend protection to groups other than those expressly
mentioned in the previous agreements, thus creating an extended protection mechanism.
Some may argue that it was an early form of complementary protection39, but it appears
more clearly to be the first sign of the elimination of categorization based on ethnic
origin, which would eventually lead to a wider international refugee definition.
On the other hand, just as states were free to extend protection to displaced persons
beyond their obligations, there were examples where they would instead practice the
forced return (refoulement) of refugees for various reasons. For instance, Poland had
issued a number of decrees to remove Russian refugees within its territory who had not
fled for political reasons40. The agreements developed in the later part of the inter-war
period stated a prohibition on refoulement of refugees who had legally entered the
country, to which the only exception was security or public order41.
Although historically important and most likely a source of inspiration to the later
development of refugee law, these instruments were not acceded to by a majority of
European states, and expulsion and forcible return for arbitrary reasons remained
engrained in common practice42. At the time, non-refoulement, the right not to be
returned to a country where one faces a risk to life, was a principle developed to protect
from subsequent deportation persons already accepted as refugees. My discussion of this
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principle in Chapter 3 will explore how it parted from refugee protection to create an
alternate mode of protection.
2.1.3. The Drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention
In this subsection, I provide insight into what protection meant in the original drafting of
the Refugee Convention, as well as its intended interaction with human rights protection
instruments. My analysis deals with the inclusion of non-refoulement in the text of the
Refugee Convention, as this is particularly important to my discussion of the concept in
Chapter 3. This section will allow a better understanding of the benchmark protection
from which additional or complementary protection is derived.
The drafting of the Refugee Convention can be deemed to have been initiated in the fall
of 1949, with a draft resolution calling for the constitution of a High Commissioner‘s
Office for Refugees, and for the drafting of a convention for the protection of refugees 43.
The resolution also calls for the provisional adoption of the definition contained in the
constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO)44, which had been
established in 1949 as a temporary specialized agency of the UN45.
Prior to this draft resolution, the UN Secretary General had issued a noteworthy report
dealing with the definition of refugee, and with the extent of international refugee
protection functions, which included the text of the IRO definition46. This report also
dealt with the role and nature of international protection, an element of great interest with
regards to the subject matter of the present thesis. Indeed, the Secretary General writes
43
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that the first agent of protection to refugees and displaced persons is the state itself, and
international protection is complementary to the state‘s protection47. In that sense,
complementary protection could actually refer to all forms of protection provided by
international law.
The definition in the IRO constitution identifies two types of persons in need of
protection. These are ―refugees‖ and ―displaced persons‖, both of which acquire the
relevant status as a result of the Second World War. The absence of state protection is
only mentioned in the case of refugees, whereas displaced persons have a temporary
status brought about by deportation by an occupying state, and from which they benefit
until they are repatriated48. The definition of refugee also includes anyone who was
considered a refugee prior to the adoption of the IRO constitution49. This tends to
accentuate the idea that international protection is fundamentally a complement to state
protection, and to suggest that member states intended to build on the existing definitions
when drafting the Refugee Convention.
In 1946, a United Nations General Assembly Resolution reaffirmed that no refugees or
displaced persons could be compelled to return to their country of origin50. This form of
non-refoulement, as an element of the protection afforded to persons who benefit from a
legally defined refugee status, was the only one officially recognized by the United
Nations, just as it was under the auspices of the League of Nations51.
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Early on in the discussion regarding international protection of asylum seekers, it was
recognized that the issue was primarily a humanitarian concern52, and not a temporary
one, as it was deemed unreasonable and inhuman to repatriate certain groups of refugees
defined merely by ethnicity, such as Jews and Armenians53. It was also proposed by
France that refugee protection should include the granting of a status, as well as material
assistance, and so would include ―legal, social, religious and political protection‖54. In
subsequent meetings, France pursued this idea further, proposing that although it may
have been appropriate for the IRO to define only specific situations where protection was
afforded, the United Nations had to avoid such discrimination and provide a wide
framework of protection55. This is consistent with the report of the Secretary General,
which defined international refugee protection as complementary to state protection,
suggesting that it should apply to all situations where state protection is unavailable.
On the other hand, the United States argued that the existing categories of refugees
should be maintained and new ones created by the General Assembly as the need would
arise56. Their perception of international protection followed a protection framework
according to which complementary protection regimes are additions to a continuously
52
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growing list of persons protected by the international community. Their proposition was
to continue a collection of specific protection regimes whenever state protection needed
to be corrected or complemented.
The distinction with the French position lay in the fact that the United States did not want
to take responsibility in advance for asylum needs that did not yet exist 57. Their approach
would thus lead to a need for successive additions of complementary regimes, whereas
the French position would lead to a unified international protection framework that would
encompass all needs through a wide definition. Indeed:
France, true to its tradition, would like the definition of the term "refugees" to be as
generous as possible; since, before the proposed convention entered into force, new
and undreamed-of categories of refugees might be created, the definition should be
couched in general terms, if necessary with specific exceptions, but should not
enumerate the categories to be protected. In view of the turbulent state of the world,
no such list could ever be complete.58
In a way, the French position also recognized that not only groups of people might need
protection, but that individuals may also find themselves in need of asylum.
The final result appears to be a compromise between the two positions, as the scope of
protection is relatively wide, but geographically and temporally limited to persons who
are displaced as a result of events that occurred in Europe before 195159. It also includes
57
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the refugees as they were previously defined in the League of Nations agreements and
conventions60. After the adoption of the Refugee Convention, the occurrence of a series
of refugee movements in Europe and northern Africa that did not satisfy the original time
limit61 resulted in a gap between the scope of the Refugee Convention and refugee
protection needs in UN member states. The 1967 Protocol62 closed this protection gap
created by the temporal and geographical limitations in the Refugee Convention, thus
achieving a formal universalization of the Convention, while maintaining its original
substantive limitations63.
Another point of interest in a discussion of complementary protection is article 33(1) of
the Refugee Convention, the first widely accepted formulation of the concept of nonrefoulement64. Based on the travaux préparatoires, the protection it offers is deemed to
apply beyond individuals recognized as refugees to non-admittance at the frontier, as well
as extradition. This is indicated by the words ―in any manner whatsoever‖65, and the
simple fact that the same reasons for persecution were repeated in a different article.
Otherwise, the two would have been unnecessarily repetitive where a reference to the
article 1 definition would have sufficed. On the other hand, Goodwin-Gill‘s analysis of
the drafting of the Convention has revealed that the members present had a clear intention
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.‖
60
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of not letting refugees be returned to any country where they face a risk, but it does not
seem to allow for individuals outside of the refugee definition to be targeted by article
3366.
McAdam further stresses that the drafters were most likely aware that this article could
expand protection to persons who did not fall under the definition of refugee given in
article 1, because article 33 embodies article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (UDHR), which states the right to enjoy asylum 67, thus indicating a desire to see
the Refugee Convention evolve along with human rights principles68. The same
principles may eventually impact on the interpretation of the concept of persecution, as
well as create independent mechanisms that prevent removal69. This view also suggests
that there was openness to the evolution of international protection, one that would be
guided by international human rights law. Chapter 3 will discuss in greater detail the
significance of non-refoulement in the expansion of international protection.
2.1.4. Evolution in the Application of the Convention Definition
Protection gaps are easy to find, as it is always possible to be more generous. The only
international legislative measure of expansion adopted after the Refugee Convention was
the removal of temporal and geographical limitations by the 1967 Protocol, but it remains
important to look into the expansion of the refugee concept, be it through a more
generous interpretation of the Refugee Convention, or by domestic legislation.
66
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After the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, it appears that states realized the need to go
further in providing for international protection needs that did not exist within the
Refugee Convention definition. To demonstrate that point, Hathaway argues that the
records of the aborted 1977 Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum meant to embody the
right to seek and enjoy asylum in the UDHR and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum 70.
Consistent with the fact that article 14 of the UDHR provides individuals with asylum
from persecution without restrictions, and that the Draft Declaration on Territorial
Asylum further proclaims that right and includes persons struggling against colonialism,
this proposed convention would have broadened the concepts of persecution and political
opinion71. In this new agreement, political opinion was to include opposition to
colonialism and apartheid, persecution would be expanded to prosecution with
persecutory intent, as well as persecution based on kinship, foreign occupation, alien
domination, and all forms of racism72.
Although this draft convention was not adopted, it remains a sign that the international
community was becoming conscious that asylum needs could manifest themselves
differently in the post-World War II world. It was recognition, over 25 years on, of the
existence of situations of persecution outside of the five defined nexus of the Refugee
Convention, where international protection was required by broader human rights
principles. The drafting of this new convention resulted in a deadlock73, which might
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explain in part the current existence of several regional agreements and domestic
legislative measures that extend protection in their own way. Also, this difficulty in
achieving a more generous international consensus may justify the use of broader human
rights instruments to expand international protection instead of adopting a new treaty.
Even though the original Refugee Convention was drafted with the aim of going beyond
a minimal common denominator to please the restrictions of all participating states, it was
done with an appreciation of the sacrifices that should be made to reach a consensus 74,
and that protection gaps would hence be created. Consequently, it would make sense to
argue that even the Convention itself can protect refugees beyond the scope of article
1(A)(2), and that nothing in it prevents the application of the status it creates to other
situations where protection is needed75.
In addition to the attempt at drafting a new convention, the development of regional
instruments, as well as informal categories of protection in state practice, have been
observed76. Hathaway pointed out, however, that expanded protection for persons who
face forced migration had not evolved into international customary law as of 1991 77. He
only identifies a customary right to be considered for temporary admission upon crossing
the border, on the basis of a need for protection78. In other words, asylum seekers have a
right to be heard when they come from a troubled country, which is merely a procedural
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right. His analysis might be different twenty years on, in customary law as well as in light
of new international legal instruments. This is especially probable given that the
Convention Against Torture, which includes another version of non-refoulement, had not
entered into force at the time. I will pursue this analysis further in chapter 3.
It has nonetheless been argued that complementary protection on the international level,
that is protection complementary to that already offered by the Refugee Convention
regime, only became part of international debates during the 1980s 79. This could indicate
that, facing the impossibility of reaching a consensus on the adoption of a new
international refugee law instrument, the international community has turned to existing
instruments to derive protection obligations. This tendency has been mainly developed by
the UNHCR early on in the 1990s, and has been instrumental in the expansion of this
institution‘s mandate to persons of concern that do not necessarily fit into the original
Refugee Convention definition80. This mandate will be discussed at greater length in the
last section of this chapter.
One point we may take away from the aborted Convention on Territorial Asylum is that,
just as this Convention was meant to expand the protective measures in the Refugee
Convention, asylum was considered by states that supported the Convention on
Territorial Asylum as a wider net of protection than refugee protection81. Thus, it would
be appropriate to refer to persons seeking refugee status or alternative protection
generally as asylum seekers or protection seekers. The term ―refugee‖ is a defined legal
concept on both domestic and international levels, as well as a legal status. An asylum
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seeker or a protection seeker includes refugees, as well as other persons who enter a new
country in search of protection and a legal status.
2.2.Defining Protection in a Legal Sense
2.2.1. Protection as a Legal Concept
As already explained, the aim of this thesis is to analyze international human rights
instruments and evaluate whether they create protection obligations for Canada as a
country of asylum. In order to make sense of these obligations, it is important to explore
the meaning of protection in the legal context, and the place of complementary protection
in the international legal framework. In this section, I start by outlining a general
definition of protection as a legal concept, followed by explanations of the more specific
concepts of state protection and international protection. I then use all these concepts to
specify a definition of complementary protection.
In its simplest form, the concept of ―protection‖ is complementary to that of ―refugee‖, in
the sense that the concept of ―refugee‖ is defined in terms of ―protection‖, and cannot be
understood without it. Nevertheless, although the concept of refugee is the subject of a
legal definition, that of protection remains undefined within international legal
instruments82. Its dictionary definition includes ―a legal or other formal measure intended
to preserve civil liberties and rights‖83. This definition may be relevant in light of article
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties84, which states that ―[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose‖. The
82
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dictionary definition of protection already suggests, through the terms ―legal or other
formal measure‖, that protection takes the form of governmental or state action.
In addition, this ordinary definition is confirmed by the object and purpose of the
Refugee Convention which, as stated in its preamble, ―[assures] refugees the widest
possible exercise of […] fundamental rights and freedoms‖85. From this, it is fair to
conclude that the use of the concept of protection in this particular convention carries the
same meaning.
A more thorough definition of protection was proposed early on by Grahl-Madsen:
The word ‗protection‘ denotes measures of some kind or other taken by a subject of
international law in order to safeguard or promote the integrity, rights or interests of
an individual. Protection may take many shapes. We may distinguish between
internal protection (‗the protection of the law‘) and external protection (diplomatic or
consular protection…). Moreover, protection may be active or passive. Thus, if a
government intercedes with another government for one of its citizens, we may speak
of active or explicit protection. On the other hand, if the authorities of one State
merely enable a person to refer to them and thereby get certain benefits from the
authorities of another State, we may call it passive or implicit protection. Typical of
the latter kind of protection is the issuing of national passports and certificates of
nationality.86
This definition is exhaustive and clearly distinguishes between state protection and
international protection, and also suggests that the Refugee Convention uses means to
instate active protection mechanisms.
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As for the context, the historical analysis in the previous section has demonstrated that
protection has come to refer to the guaranteeing of a number of rights by states. The exact
nature of the rights included in this concept and the extent to which they are protected is
one of the central questions addressed in this thesis.
In his work, Fortin explores the meaning of protection within the refugee definition. This
is useful to my argument, to the extent that the use of the concept in the Refugee
Convention, being the main basis for protection under international law, has rendered it
the most reliable indication of the meaning of this concept in international law in general.
The work leading up to the conclusion of the Refugee Convention may also be a
testimonial to the perception of protection held by states at the time, as well as their
expectations in terms of its evolution.
As exposed in my analysis of the League of Nations refugee protection instruments,
protection was afforded based on specific need, and the main criterion was the lack of
state protection. This view is supported by Fortin87, but he introduces the idea that the
implied meaning of the concept of protection in the Refugee Convention definition was
originally that of diplomatic protection88. This suggests that protection in the legal
context may be understood as state protection, which leads me to a more specific
discussion on this type of protection.
2.2.2. State Protection
Within the realm of state protection, Fortin argues that it can be either external or
internal, and he describes the latter type of state protection as follows:
87
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[It may be] promotional, preventive or remedial in nature, and implies the existence
and effective functioning of administrative and judicial structures, as well as the
existence and effective functioning of mechanisms and procedures for the
investigation, prosecution and punishment of violations of the person‘s rights.89
Such a definition is highly reminiscent of a larger international scheme of protection of
civil and political rights, and Fortin observes that various human rights instruments
guarantee such equal protection by the law90.
I have already mentioned McAdam‘s view that the Refugee Convention may well have
been considered an international legislative vehicle for the non-binding UDHR, as well as
the then embryonic covenants on human rights91. It is thus possible that, in keeping with
this awareness of human rights, the concept of protection used in the Refugee Convention
definition encompasses the state‘s protection of the universal human rights of its citizens.
However, Fortin argues that it refers merely to diplomatic protection, defined as
consisting ―primarily in the defence by the State of the interests and rights of its nationals
abroad, when such interests and rights are not respected‖92. His position is supported by
two main arguments, the first of which is the definition of refugee by the Institute of
International Law, which, as he suggests, inspired the Refugee Convention definition93.
The original definition stated:
In the present resolutions, the term ―refugee‖ refers to any individual who, due to
political events on the territory of their State of nationality, has voluntarily or
involuntarily left the territory of said State, or is unable to return to it, and has
acquired no other nationality and does not benefit from the diplomatic protection of a
89
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State [translated by author]. 94
Fortin argues that despite the omission of the qualification of protection as diplomatic,
the definition of the Refugee Convention is essentially meant to be the same as the
foregoing. However, there must be a reason why the term ―diplomatic‖ was dropped from
the Refugee Convention definition, and it would seem safe to say that the intention might
have been to allow for the evolution of the concept of ―protection‖ from a term of art
meaning diplomatic protection95, to a larger concept including persons who do not
possess a nationality. Hathaway and Foster also refute the historical evidence brought
forth by Fortin, arguing that it is taken out of context, and is too scarce to lead to the
conclusion that the drafters of the Convention had diplomatic protection in mind when
they used the word ―protection‖96.
Secondly, Fortin attempts to make the point that the requirement for the claimant to be
outside her country of habitual residence means that the definition can only refer to
diplomatic protection97, but in many cases a claimant has fled her country due to lack of
internal protection from persecution. It may be ―evident that the only protection that can
be made available to persons who are outside their country of nationality, or to which
such persons can resort, is diplomatic protection‖98, but such an interpretation does not
take into account the reasons which have driven this person outside of their country.
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To further demonstrate his point that ―protection‖ is actually equivalent to diplomatic
protection, Fortin argues that refugee status results from a failure by the state to interfere
when rights are violated, and adversely, cannot be considered as a positive duty to
protect99. He calls attention to situations where the state itself persecutes a person,
maintaining that it would be absurd to say that such persecution results from the refusal
of the state to protect its people against itself100. As euphemistic or pleonastic as it might
seem to qualify these cases as results of the inability of the state to protect, they are still
situations where the state fails to protect, and the fact that the supposed protector
becomes the persecutor only makes the fear of persecution more well-founded and gives
better reason to leave one‘s country. This incongruity does not mean, a contrario, that
there is no positive duty of internal protection from the state when the agent of
persecution is non-governmental. I will attempt to further outline the nature of a state‘s
duty to protect in the following section.
Fortin‘s position, though it fosters an important reflection on the meaning of protection,
is not shared by most scholars. The reflection and criticism to which his opinion has led
me reflects the majority position taken by legal scholars. McAdam‘s work is based on the
premise that the need for international protection arises when a state fails to protect the
basic human rights of its citizens, and it is a view that was expressed by Goodwin-Gill in
his introduction to the International Journal of Refugee Law101. Another opposing view
to Fortin‘s position stems from Hathaway‘s work on defining the requirement that there
be no internal flight alternative (IFA) available for protection to be granted102. The idea
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that a person cannot be considered a refugee if they can safely benefit from the protection
of their state of nationality in another region of their country, implies that lack of internal
protection in the entire country is a legitimate reason to leave one‘s country and make a
refugee claim103.
In a further discussion on the concept of IFA, Hathaway and Foster point out the main
flaws of Fortin‘s analysis of the Refugee Definition in these terms:
Taking account of both the ordinary meaning of the notion of ‗protection‖ and the
ways in which the term ‗protection‘ is used elsewhere in the 1951 Convention, the
Fortin position is anomalous. In particular, the Preamble refers to the intention of the
parties to ‗revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the
status of refugees and to extend the scope of protection offered by such instruments‘,
and to the importance of coordinated measures to facilitate UNHCR‘s task of
‗supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees‘.
Clearly, ‗protection‘ as referred to in the preamble cannot mean only ‗diplomatic
protection‘, since the Convention is concerned nearly exclusively with the provision
of ‗protection‘ understood in the sense of human rights protection.104
They also demonstrate that Fortin‘s position is inconsistent with both the jurisprudence
that recognizes refugee law as substitute protection and the UNHCR‘s interpretations of
―protection‖ in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word105.
Fortin may be right to point out that the contemporary view of protection has stemmed
from diplomatic protection, just as my historical inquiry has shown that diplomatic
asylum was the first source of international agreements regarding persons fleeing their
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country. However, the definition in the Refugee Convention is clearly not limited to
diplomatic protection, and includes situations where internal protection is lacking. I
would rather side with Goodwin-Gill‘s assessment of the refugee definition as a ―critical
point of departure in determining who is entitled to the protection and assistance of the
United Nations, for it is the lack of protection by their own government which
distinguishes refugees from ordinary aliens‖106. This absence of protection may occur ―as
a matter of law, for example, in the case of stateless persons; or as a matter of fact, where
individuals or groups are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the
government of their country‖107.
In either case, lack of protection by the state both on the internal and external levels is the
trigger for international protection. Fortin even admits this in his discussion of stateless
persons, as he acknowledges that stateless persons cannot benefit from diplomatic
protection because having a nationality is a requirement for such protection108. No state
has failed to protect them, since no state has ever had the responsibility to do so. Fortin is
right in his affirmation that stateless persons clearly deserve international protection as
compensation for their predicament109, but it would be wrong to suggest that it is because
they lack diplomatic protection, for they lack internal state protection as well. Refugees,
in turn, find themselves in the same situation, even if they have a nationality110.

106

Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee, supra note 24 at 8.
Ibid. at 15.
108
Fortin, supra note 87 at 555.
109
Ibid. at 556.
110
Ibid. at 556-557.
107

34

2.2.3. International Protection
This discussion on stateless persons flows naturally into the nature and the role of the
international protection of refugees, stateless persons, and other displaced persons who
need it, in relation to state protection. This idea that the state is the provider of protection,
and that, conversely, de jure or de facto statelessness calls for the intervention of
international protection, suggests that international protection is indeed complementary to
state protection. Refugee status is defined by a positive criterion, that is the existence of
an apprehension of persecution, but that fear must be accompanied by a lack of
protection. This makes international protection appear to be a second recourse, or an
alternative to state protection.
Fortin argues that ―[stateless] persons are no longer deprived of all protection in the
international sphere, as they are entitled to the protection accorded to every human being
under international law‖

111

. Thus, his position is that international law takes

responsibility for individuals who are unprotected by states112. Refugees, meanwhile, are
individuals who have a nationality, but do not benefit from the protection of their country
of nationality113. This lack of protection makes them de jure stateless. Aside from the fact
that it has to be related to other criteria, statelessness or lack of protection remains the
basis for the legitimacy of international protection114.
This reasoning is consistent with the previously cited report of the UN Secretary-General,
which unequivocally defines international refugee protection as complementary to state
111
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protection115. This perception has been further confirmed by a former UN High
Commissioner for refugees, who interpreted the function of international protection as
being supplemental to the protection offered by the refugee‘s country of residence116.
2.2.4. The Complementary Nature of Protection
The previous explanations on different levels of protection will allow for a better
understanding of the concept of complementary protection. This section first defines what
the term ―complementary‖ means, how it is distinguishable from alternative protection,
and how it applies to protection in a legal context.
According to the dictionary, ―complementary‖ refers to ―completing‖ or ―forming a
complement‖117. Such a definition suggests that when something is complementary, it
forms a complete and absolute entity or a coherent whole when added to what it is
complementary to, much like two complementary angles form a right angle. In that sense,
complementary protection would have to create a complete body of protection, one that
leaves no protection gaps. In light of my historical overview of the emergence of
international refugee protection, the latter was likely meant to be complementary to state
protection in such a way.
Given that complementary protection may refer to international law as being
complementary to domestic law in terms of protecting individual‘s civil rights and
liberties, the Refugee Convention itself could be an instrument of complementary
protection. On the other hand, it could be said that the complementary nature of
115

Refugees and Stateless Persons: Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 46; Fortin, supra note 87
at 569.
116
Sadruddin Aga Khan, ―Legal Problems relating to Refugees and Displaced Persons‖, (1976) 149 Rec.
des Cours 329, cited by Fortin, supra note 87 at 570.
117
New Oxford American Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. ―complementary‖.

36

protection lies within the source of protection, as opposed to the form of protection or the
status to which it leads118. Protection, it seems, would thus be complementary in relation
to a ―formal‖ source of protection119. Currently, the Refugee Convention is the only
formal source of international protection, but other sources may achieve this formal status
with time.
Given the evolution in refugee status and protection seeking situations, and the new
protection mechanisms that have emerged from that, the Refugee Convention has evolved
into a solidified, formal protection regime, and that complementary protection comes
from alternative sources separate from it. I also choose to use the term ―complementary‖
for international protection, instead of ―alternative‖ protection. An alternative is
something ―that is available as another possibility‖120. It would be consistent with the
original function of the international refugee protection regime as a complement to state
protection to speak of complementary international protection, rather than alternative
protection. Although complementary international protection comes from a range of
sources, it tends toward the ideal of a complete protection regime, hence the pertinence of
the term ―complementary‖.
Domestic legislation, on the other hand, relies on a government‘s individual policy and
does not necessarily hold such ambitions of complete protection. On the contrary, when
an asylum-seeker enters Canada, he or she can choose to present a claim under section 96
IRPA121 for refugee status, or under section 97 IRPA122, to be recognized as a person in
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need of protection. More often than not, he or she would file a claim under both sections,
and if refused under section 96 IRPA, will hope to be accepted under section 97 IRPA.
Section 97 IRPA thus fits better under the definition of alternative protection. Generally,
the domestic implementation of international legislation is embodied in different
legislative measures that offer alternative bases for protection claims. Hence, it seems
more appropriate to speak of alternative protection when discussing the implementation
of complementary international protection on a domestic level.
2.3.Human Rights Theory
3.1.1. The Relationship between Human Rights Protection and Refugee
Protection
When discussing the meaning of protection within international refugee law, I have made
several allusions to the idea that the objects of protection are the interests and physical
integrity of the person, embodied through their civil and political rights. My overview of
the drafting of the Refugee Convention also revealed its ties to international human rights
treaties. This begs the question as to the nature of the relationship between the protection
of human rights and refugee protection in international law.
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.‖
122
Section 97 IRPA: ―(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their
country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former
habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other
individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in
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Fortin claims that the fundamental difference between the two regimes is that they
employ two different standards of proof, such that ―[where] human rights require
certitude, refugee instruments only require likelihood‖123. He points out that international
human rights sanctioning mechanisms require a violation, whereas refugee protection is a
more preventive regime124. This difference in thresholds could constitute an argument
against describing protection in international human rights instruments as complementary
protection.
However, his characterization overlooks the fact that some human rights require only
likelihood as well.

This is true of provisions such as article 3 of CAT125, which

recognizes the right not to be returned to a country where one faces a risk of torture. It
involves likelihood or, more specifically, ―substantial grounds‖ for belief that the right
could be breached. This example introduces the possibility that provisions resembling
what Fortin perceives to be refugee protection, that is protection based on likelihood, are
introduced into what can be generally deemed to be a human rights protection treaty.
Throughout my analysis of the complementary protection obligations set out by
international human rights law instruments, this distinction between likelihood and actual
violations will be useful to identify complementary protection mechanisms. Indeed,
where the criterion for intervention is the likelihood of a violation, it can be argued that
we are faced with a complementary protection provision. This might be true of individual
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articles, such as in the CAT, but I will also attempt to find out if such a criterion of
likelihood may also be deduced from the object and purpose of the human rights treaties I
will examine.
In Hathaway‘s view, there is no distinction in terms of the standard of proof, but he
recognizes the existence of ―refugee-specific‖ rights within human rights instruments,
which is consistent with the idea that the Refugee Convention was expanded by the
incorporation of such rights within international human rights instruments126. He argues
that ―while there has been only modest evolution of the refugee rights regime since 1951,
the broader field of international human rights law has undergone exponential change‖127.
He also considers the Refugee Convention as ―only the second major human rights
convention adopted by the United Nations‖128.
Despite the limited evolution of the refugee protection regime, he considers that ―the
maturation of human rights law over the past half-century has to a certain extent filled the
vacuum of protection that required the development of a refugee-specific rights regime in
1951‖129. According to this reasoning, refugee law is a component of international human
rights law. As such, it was formed by the Refugee Convention and expanded by the
growing number of human rights conventions. Following this view, complementary
international protection forms an integral part of international human rights law, and any
human rights treaty may contain so-called ―refugee-specific‖ rights. I agree with this
view, but since the term ―refugee-specific‖ is not clearly defined, I choose to use the
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element of likelihood as identified by Fortin, in order to identify such specific rights
within human rights instruments.
Although scholars working in the field of international refugee law consider the
connection with international human rights law, such interest does not seem to be
reciprocated by scholars in the field of international human rights. Works that serve as a
reference in the latter field make no mention of refugee-specific rights or even the
Refugee Convention as an instrument of human rights protection130. This might be due
merely to a lack of popularity of the topic among scholars in the field, but it does call for
a careful justification to any claim that a human rights instrument contains provisions that
provide complementary protection for asylum seekers.
2.3.2. The State’s Duty to Protect
Working with the previously stated assumption that refugee protection and
complementary protection are part of human rights law or, at the very least, connected to
it, it becomes relevant to look into the role of the state in the application of a person‘s
right to seek such protection. The issue at hand becomes the nature of the obligation of a
state that has ratified a human rights treaty.
The first problem faced within a human rights context is the generality of rights. They
make sense and are easily accepted when stated in a far-reaching manner, but their
application to specific problems is difficult131. This is even more problematic in the
context of protection-seekers, as their status is derived from the lack of protection of
these general rights. The challenge thus becomes the identification of the rights that
130
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should be protected, as well as the extent to which they should be protected, which in turn
allows the definition of the lack or failure of protection.
The discussion of the extent to which rights should be guaranteed so that a state can be
deemed to protect a person in a satisfactory manner poses the question of the nature of
the duties correlative to rights. In the context of refugee law, this becomes a discussion of
the duties of the state rather than the individual, as it is based on the failure of one state to
fulfil its duties and the search for another state that can.
Fredman derives a traditional view of rights as divided between the justiciable civil and
political rights, which entail a duty of restraint, and the more aspirational socio-economic
and cultural rights to which positive duties are attached132. In Fredman‘s own view,
however, these two types of rights cannot be conceived as two entirely separate groups,
as they inevitably overlap, and ―they cannot be coherently distinguished by the kind of
duty to which they give rise‖133. The duties are rather shaped and limited by the ideology
we use as a guide for our analysis of rights. For instance, civil and political rights
examined with an understanding of freedom as non-intervention entail only negative
duties, whereas a wider conception of freedom as the ability to exercise one‘s rights will
entail positive duties134.
As a simple example within the refugee protection context, the right to life and security
cannot be infringed upon by the state for reasons of a person‘s race or national
background. That state nevertheless has a duty to provide people who are being
persecuted for such reasons with effective police or security forces and complaint
132
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mechanisms in case of corruption or misconduct. If one or both of these duties are
unfulfilled, the target of persecution may legitimately seek asylum in a state that will
fulfil them. This deconstruction of duties is embedded in the Refugee convention, but my
analysis of complementary protection aims at attempting to see if such duties can be
derived from other rights, which are not explicitly accounted for in the formal refugee
definition. The presence of a duty to protect will be an indicator of the existence of a
basis for complementary protection when this duty to protect is unfulfilled.
Fredman develops a general analysis of the duty to protect based on the idea that the
right-holder has to be protected from the perpetrator of the breach, without infringing on
the possible competing rights of said perpetrator. Fredman uses the examples of the right
to assembly, the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture. In these different
cases, the agent who opposes the right-holder has different levels of competing rights,
such as the right to counter-demonstrate which opposes the right to assembly. She then
demonstrates that the level of protection required from the state varies accordingly135.
This consideration will be useful when determining at which point specific rights become
a basis for a complementary protection regime. Indeed, the criteria that lead to the
conclusion that there is a failure to protect will vary according to the rights under
assessment.
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2.4.UNHCR’s Obligations in Relation to States’ Responsibility for Protection
Seekers
As a body mandated by the UN General Assembly to assist governments in the
repatriation or resettlement of refugees136, the UNHCR may be considered as a source of
protection for asylum seekers outside of international treaties. This section briefly
explores how the UNHCR expands and implements the protection offered by
international refugee law and human rights instruments. This thesis centres on
international treaties, but it remains relevant to observe other ways in which states
manage to reach consensus on international protection of asylum seekers and their human
rights. These mechanisms may reveal themselves to be a quicker way for states to
respond to new emergencies and situations where international protection of groups or
individuals is required.
The first two subsections deal with the UNHCR‘s mandate and activities, in order to
analyze how they have evolved beyond international treaties. Within this analysis, I
weave in reflections on the UNHCR‘s position or importance in relation to international
law and what it means for the interpretation of the latter. In the third section, I look into
the interactions of the Canadian protection system with the UNHCR‘s activities.
2.4.1. Complementary Protection Through the Evolution of the UNHCR
Mandate
The legal foundation of the UNHCR‘s statute is a UN General Assembly resolution, and
the statute itself enables the General Assembly, as well as the Economic and Social
Council, to adopt more resolutions that expand or amend said mandate137. These
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resolutions generally fit into one of two types. These are general resolutions relating to
the developments in refugee law and the UNHCR‘s mandate in general, and specific
resolutions relating to situations arising in a given region or country138. The UNHCR‘s
original mandate includes promoting the ratification of international conventions for the
protection of refugees, promoting the admission and settlement of refugees, promoting
and working with governments towards measures to improve the situation of refugees
and reducing the numbers of persons requiring protection, as well as exchanging legal
and other information on refugees with governments139. The term ―refugee‖ is defined
within the statute itself, and essentially reiterates the text of the Refugee Convention
definition140.
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Hence, the UNHCR‘s mandate was originally limited to the application of the 1951
Refugee Convention141, but as it was constituted by the General Assembly, later
resolutions of the Assembly or the ECOSOC expanding its responsibilities or endorsing
its initiatives have had the effect of continuously expanding the UNHCR‘s mandate,
creating a distinction between the original 1950 Statute and the UNHCR‘s effective
mandate142. The latter provides protection and assistance to different categories of
persons within and outside of the Convention definition. Türk explains this widened
mandate as follows:
Demonstrating the underlying broad consensus of the international community to
provide UNHCR with specific responsibilities in respect of certain groups of persons,
successive General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions, supported by UNHCR‘s
Executive Committee, have had the effect of extending the High Commissioner‘s
competence to five main categories: (i) refugees and asylum seekers; (ii) stateless
persons; (iii) returnees; (iv) the internally displaced; and (v) persons threatened with
displacement or otherwise at risk.143
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One recent example of such a resolution is for assistance to refugees, returnees and
displaced persons in Africa144.
It appears that the evolved mandate of the UNHCR explicitly includes persons outside of
the refugee definition, encompassing many other categories of persons who do not
benefit from the protection of their state, or even those who are at risk of losing such
protection. As such, the UNHCR‘s extended mandate could be considered as a
complementary protection mechanism created by the international community.
Some specific initiatives have been created to deal with situations where persons do not
fit into the Convention definition of refugees, such as the cluster approach, which will be
included in my discussion of natural disasters in chapter 5. This strategy is based on the
spontaneous partnerships of international organisations and NGOs to provide a concerted
effort of humanitarian assistance in situations such as natural disasters or armed conflict.
Recent data have revealed that about half of the world‘s internally displaced persons 145
have been assisted through an arrangement in which UNHCR was the lead agency or a
key partner146. The existence of such strategies for intervening in cases where individuals
would otherwise remain unprotected, demonstrates that the UNHCR has the flexibility to
adopt new initiatives that are later condoned by the General Assembly.
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However, the idea that UNHCR would close gaps in international protection remains a
source of discomfort and a recurring issue for the UNHCR 147, as its statute and the
resolutions that expand it are not international treaties. Therefore, the UNHCR‘s opinions
are not a direct source of international law. Türk defines the UNHCR‘s position in the
realm of international law in the following terms:
UNHCR

has the competence to develop

progressively

international

law

and standards relating to populations of concern. It is broadly recognized that the
international legal framework is generally adequate to cover various forms of forced
displacement, but there is a continuing need to supplement and substantiate some of
its aspects, to identify normative gaps and to fill those through the progressive
development of law standards.148
Despite the perhaps overly optimistic assessment of the adequacy of the international
legal framework, this statement rightfully defines the UNHCR as a standard-setting
organization. Its initiatives and interpretations become customary through approval by
the General Assembly, which suggests approval by the international community. Because
they tend to harmonize national interpretations of international law through their
influence on state refugee protection systems149, the UNHCR agents appear to strive
towards building customary interpretations of international law. They may also influence
the drafting of international conventions and their application within individual states.
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2.4.2. The UNHCR’s Executive Committee Resolutions and their Normative
Value
The UNHCR‘s main vehicle as an international standard setting organization is its
Executive Committee. The Executive Committee was established by resolution of the
General Assembly in 1957 and originally required to have twenty to twenty-five
members150. Following successive enlargements over the years, its membership has
recently increased to seventy-eight151. The Executive Committee‘s role is to advise the
UNHCR as to its statutory functions and deciding whether to provide protection and
assistance when specific refugee problems arise152. It essentially manages the way the
UNHCR fulfils its mandate, and as such, it must interpret the scope of the mandate and
the extent of international protection that is attributed to displaced persons under
international law.
Within the realm of complementary international protection, the Executive Committee
has recognized that individuals who do not fit within the Convention definition may need
international protection and deserve a legal status in the country of asylum. It generally
accepts that all individuals who are facing displacement, coupled with lack of protection,
fall under the mandate of the UNHCR153. In their discussion on complementary
protection, the Committee mainly vies for inclusive protection regimes and status
determination based mainly on protection needs, by stating:
Beneficiaries of complementary protection should be identified according to their
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international protection needs, and treated in conformity with those needs and their
human rights. The criteria for refugee status in the 1951 Convention should be
interpreted in such a manner that individuals who fulfil the criteria are so recognized
and protected under that instrument, rather than being treated under complementary
protection schemes.154
The Executive Committee thus recognizes the importance of creating complementary
forms of protection, but warns against the use of complementary protection mechanisms,
which do not benefit from a universal definition, to deny rights to refugees. It also
encourages the UNHCR to engage in discussions with states to develop adequate
protection regimes for protection needs outside of the Refugee Convention155.
The Executive Committee‘s activities further strengthen the connection between
international refugee law and international human rights law, through the constant
affirmation of the humanitarian nature of international protection156. Its decisions also
frequently refer to the importance of considering the specific needs of women and
children faced with refugee situations157. Through its contribution to a wide definition of
―refugee‖, the Committee has assisted vulnerable persons who otherwise would not have
been protected for reasons such as inability to leave their country. In sum, the Executive
Committee‘s conclusions may be considered as acceptance by the international
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community of the humanitarian activities of the UNHCR and openness to new forms of
protection. However, they remain non-binding for states, and it is possible that the same
states that are on the Committee would be less generous when drafting a binding legal
instrument.
2.4.3. Effects of the UNHCR Mandate on the Canadian Refugee Protection
Regime
Since the legal basis for the UNHCR and the state obligations attached to it are UN
General Assembly resolutions, they are not binding for member states. The statute of the
UNHCR, nonetheless, appeals to states‘ cooperation in the fulfilment of the mandate it
sets out. The General Assembly essentially calls upon states to cooperate with UNHCR
activities and ratify all conventions that provide international protection 158. The mandate
of the UNHCR thus encompasses all the obligations that states have through treaty law,
but expands beyond it. Canada does not have such an extensive mandate as the UNHCR
does, but is bound to cooperate with it as a member of the international community.
The UNHCR has, nonetheless, had a direct and continuous influence on Canadian
refugee law. The UNHCR‘s intervention is not only justified under its mandate, it is also
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welcomed in most stages of status determination. Indeed, the IRPA explicitly allows
agents of the UNHCR to attend a refugee status determination hearing159.
From this study of the evolution of international protection and the conceptual framework
of international protection and international human rights law, this thesis now turns to an
application of various human rights instruments to the international protection context.
The first of these will be the right not to be subjected to torture as provided for by the
Convention Against Torture.

159

Section 166(e) IRPA: ―[A] representative or agent of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees is entitled to observe proceedings concerning a protected person or a person who has made a
claim to refugee protection.‖

52

Chapter 3. The Expansion of Protection by the Convention Against Torture and
the Principle of Non-Refoulement
The principle of non-refoulement emerged along with the international definition of
refugee status, and is the cornerstone of this chapter. Formerly applicable exclusively to
persons already recognized as refugees and included in article 33 of the Refugee
Convention itself, it is now more widely used to protect any person from return to a
country where it is likely that they will face torture or cruel or unusual treatment. The
inclusion of the right to non-refoulement within article 3 of the Convention Against
Torture formally links it with the prohibition of torture and consecrates its expansion to
all persons regardless of refugee status, thus transforming it into a mechanism of
complementary international protection. This chapter seeks to untangle the different uses
of the principle of non-refoulement, along with an overview of the state duties it creates.
This will form a basis for determining whether Canada complies with the obligations
created by this complementary international protection mechanism.
I begin my analysis by examining the prohibition of torture from the historical and
theoretical point of view, in order to make sense of the right not to be subjected to torture
as an element of non-refoulement. An analysis of the state duties related to the
prohibition of torture will be helpful to gain a deeper understanding of the obligations
with regards to non-refoulement. In the following section, I delimit the scope of nonrefoulement and justify its qualification as a mechanism of international complementary
protection. I apply my theoretical analysis of state duties with regards to torture to the
exclusions to non-refoulement. Finally, I use these reflections to evaluate the integration
of these duties in Canadian law through different sections of the IRPA and case law.
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3.1.The Prohibition of Torture
3.1.1. The Origins and Legal Basis for the Prohibition of Torture
The core element of a complementary international protection mechanism based on nonrefoulement in the Convention Against Torture (CAT) is the prohibition of torture itself.
The CAT is a new legal suppression of a millennial practice that was widespread among
European civilizations. A striking characteristic of the study of early practices of torture
is the moral dilemma that accompanies it. For example, according to the principles
guiding the administration of torture in Roman times, information obtained under torture
could not be used as main evidence in a trial, but could complete evidence already
acquired through other means160. In addition to the unwritten rule that it should be used in
moderation, some principles were used by the Romans to limit the practice in terms of the
age or health condition of the subject161. This suggests that though the practice was legal,
it was often not considered defensible from a moral point of view.
Another pattern that emerges is that torture was more commonly used on individuals who
were not considered as right-holders, as was the case of heretics during the Middle Ages,
or even individuals who were not considered as citizens or human beings, as it appears
through records of it being inflicted more commonly on slaves in the Roman Empire162.
Such categorizations of individuals excluded some people from civil rights, and this
denotes a moral impetus prohibiting the practice of torture on individuals who could,
indeed, benefit from civil rights. Nonetheless, it was not recognized as a moral
requirement to spare individuals accused of a crime from the practice, as it remained a
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common method for establishing ancillary evidence until the late 18th century. It was
discarded by European governments based on rational and logical demonstrations by
criminologists such as Beccaria163, which showed that it was not an effective method of
proof and too often resulted in the punishment of innocent people164.
The resurgence of torture under 20th century totalitarian regimes, along with other horrific
human rights violations, prompted the international community to prohibit it in article 5
of the UDHR in 1948165. The practice was, nonetheless, commonly used by European
states for political control during the cold war era, as reported in cases presented before
the European Court of Human Rights166. At the same time, Amnesty International
spearheaded an international campaign for the eradication of torture167. These efforts to
specifically tackle the persistence of torture were mirrored by the United Nations, with
the inclusion of the prohibition of torture in Article 7 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966168, and the adoption of the Declaration on the
Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment169 in 1975. It was then renewed and strengthened
with the first legally binding Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 1984170.
The CAT contains a detailed definition of torture in article 1, which includes the
infliction of severe pain or suffering by a public official, with the exception of suffering
arising from a lawful sanction171. The CAT requires that states undertake measures to
eliminate torture within their own territory, as well as measures such as nonrefoulement172, which are meant to avoid supporting or encouraging the practice in other
states. Article 3 of CAT codifies the principle of non-refoulement, stating that no one
shall be returned to a state where they face a risk of torture. In paragraph 3(1), it states the
prohibition to return anyone to ―another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture‖. Paragraph 3(2)
clarifies the nature of the ―substantial grounds‖, stating that they cover ―all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights‖. This suggests
that general non-compliance with international human rights of a state of origin can
become a basis for granting asylum.
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According to the travaux préparatoires surrounding article 3 of CAT and nonrefoulement, much of the discussion centred around paragraph 3(2) and whether it should
contain examples of what constitutes a ―consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights‖173. Interestingly, the Canadian delegation expressed
disappointment with the fact that paragraph 3(1) only mentions torture, leaving out cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment174.
The prohibition of torture is known as a jus cogens norm in international law, which is
one that allows for no derogation whatsoever175. It appears easy to assert that a strong
normative base in both international treaties and international customary law prohibits the
use of torture, but this view has been challenged176. Watson writes that ―[if] one is
disposed to adopt a positivistic approach to legal rules, equating legal validity with the
identification and reiteration of ―official‖ written norms, rather than with norms which
are efficacious, then such a treaty regime establishes a satisfactory body of prohibitive
rules‖177. He goes on to make the point that ―[if], on the other hand, one is less concerned
with the world of conceptualism than with the realm of reality, then the fact that there is
widespread state practice in violation of the treaty regime is still very relevant‖178.
This sheds light on the fact that a norm that could be considered strong and as a source of
pride for the international legal system may upon closer examination reveal itself to be
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ineffective. It is also consistent with the history of torture, which shows that it was
considered immoral, but was still widely perpetrated through centuries. It is a valid point,
and the text of the CAT itself suggests an awareness of the possible non-compliance of
states with this prohibition.
The clearest indication of that awareness is the provision for asylum within the
Convention. It includes not only the obligation to provide international protection from
torture, but also a commitment not to encourage or endorse states that are known to
practice torture. This could be a sign that the inclusion of asylum grounds in an
international human rights instrument is not merely meant to compensate for the absence
of an asylum convention, but also a way to make the protection of international human
rights more efficient in providing shelter from non-complying states.
3.1.2. State Duties and Interests in Relation to Torture and NonRefoulement
As mentioned before, Fredman‘s theory of state duties regarding the protection of human
rights is useful for untangling the connections between the state, the right-holder, and the
perpetrator of the breach of human rights. In the model she uses, she demonstrates that
the competing rights and interests of the state and the perpetrator of the breach limit an
individual‘s rights, and that different individual rights create varying levels of competing
rights. In other words, each right creates a different interaction between these three
actors179.
Accordingly, as a jus cogens norm, or an absolute right, the right not to be subjected to
torture does not allow much weight to be allotted to the rights of the perpetrator of the
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breach, as would be the case, for instance, if we were dealing with the right of
assembly180. Fredman describes the state‘s duty to protect as a very strong one in
unequivocal terms:
This can be seen in Z v UK181, which concerned a claim that the State had failed in its
duty to protect children against inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted by their
parents. In this case, the Court stressed that ‗Article 3 enshrines one of the most
fundamental values of democratic society‘. This leads to a strong duty to protect,
deriving from the obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the [European Convention
on Human Rights].182
Hence, when it comes to torture and non-refoulement, the state‘s duty involves more than
merely taking reasonable steps to protect the right. It has a duty to guarantee individuals
to be free from torture or cruel and degrading treatment or punishment183.
In relation to Watson‘s criticism that a norm cannot be considered as effective unless it is
always respected, Fredman proposes a more nuanced view. She has shown that most
rights pose a problem of indeterminacy and competing principles, but the right not to be
subject to torture is an absolute one, and as such, involves a more rigid obligation from
the state. Although it is not absolutely respected in practice, it is at least widely
recognized and applied as such by courts, whereas other human rights involve a weighing
of competing rights184. Despite criticism regarding its application, the prohibition of
torture may thus be appropriately qualified as a jus cogens norm.
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3.2.Theory of Non-Refoulement
The complementary protection mechanism contained in article 3 CAT is an example and
a renewed use of the principle of non-refoulement. Generally, this principle holds that
―no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face
persecution or torture‖185. This definition brings out the question of whether the principle
applies only to refugees. I have already outlined through the history and evolution of
refugee law and asylum practices that non-refoulement was conceived as a right
pertaining to persons who had already been recognized as refugees 186. However, the
inclusion of the principle in article 3 of CAT makes no mention of refugees, as it refers to
persons in general. Hence, this section proposes to clarify the definition and scope of the
principle of non-refoulement, before moving on to a justification of its qualification as
complementary protection, and a discussion of exclusions to the principle.
3.2.1. Definition and Scope
The association between non-refoulement and refugee or asylum provisions originates in
early to mid-nineteenth century, when the principle of non-extradition or non-rejection
became associated with the possibility of persecution187. Previously, refoulement was
merely a term referring to summary return to the frontier of aliens who did not possess
appropriate identification188. Goodwin-Gill‘s inquiry into the history of non-refoulement
as a sidekick to the development of refugee protection leads him to the conclusion that
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the right to non-refoulement, as expressed in article 33 of the Refugee Convention, is a
rule ―clearly designed to benefit the refugee‖189.
Goodwin-Gill remains aware of the reality beyond the Convention‘s design; he expresses
concern that the application of such a principle would be predicated on a person already
being recognized as a refugee by the state190. This indeed creates a loophole that
significantly limits the scope of the principle, because it means that individuals may be
returned to torture while their status determination is pending. Goodwin-Gill evaluated
state practice in the application of article 33 of the Refugee Convention. His research
revealed that, despite a few instances where state practice confirms a restrictive view of
non-refoulement as applicable only to recognized refugees, the principle has generally
evolved to be applicable as soon as asylum seekers arrive at the frontier, hence rejecting
the idea of dependence upon status recognition191. His view is that state practice closes
the protection gap created between entry and status recognition, and the application of
article 33 to asylum seekers ―at least during an initial period and in appropriate
circumstances‖192 has become a customary norm.
Stenberg reaches the same conclusion. He bases his argument in part on the original legal
signification of the verb ‗refouler‘ in French, which expresses a right of non-return upon
entry. Its use in the English version of article 33 of the Refugee Convention without
translation thus conveys the same meaning193. Although both Stenberg and Goodwin-Gill
recognize that article 33 may apply to persons who have entered the country seeking
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refuge before they benefit from refugee status, it is still applicable only to persons who
are refugees, and not to persons who may seek protection based on grounds outside of the
Refugee Convention. As a result, it would not apply to other asylum seekers upon entry.
Hence, there is room for an expansion of the principle by the CAT.
Regardless of the original intention behind article 33 of the Refugee Convention, the
principle of non-refoulement has evolved through state practice in the 40 years following
its adoption, as well as by a number of UN resolutions194. This point is demonstrated
through examples of state practice such as the ―B status‖ in Sweden, which is a domestic
mechanism of alternative protection195. It is also evidenced through regional treaties such
as the 1969 Organization for African Unity Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa196
and the Cartagena Declaration of 1984197, which contain provisions for the application
of non-refoulement to persons beyond the refugee definition who are threatened by
violence or by massive human rights violations198. The subsequent use of nonrefoulement in a general treaty aimed at prohibiting torture seems to be merely the next
logical step in the expansion of the scope of the principle of non-refoulement.
Non-refoulement within the framework of CAT applies ―to everyone, irrespective of their
nationality or legal status, whether they are inside or outside their country of origin and
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whether or not they fear being harmed for reasons of discrimination‖199. This does not
mean that the protection offered by article 3 of CAT is without its limits. More precisely,
based on the objective of this provision and the concept of national protection, ―it is fair
to suggest that in cases of dual or multiple nationality the prohibition on refoulement does
not apply in situations in which the person concerned can obtain protection from another
country of which he is a national‖200, since ―a person applying for protection from
refoulement must first seek protection from his own State rather than a foreign one‖201.
Furthermore, the association of non-refoulement with torture brings its own set of
caveats, due to the scope of the definition of torture in article 1 CAT. The definition
contains requirements in terms of the intent of the perpetrator, which must be either
linked to the interest or policies of the state, or perpetrated by a representative of the
state. It also includes requirements regarding the purpose for which torture is practiced202.
In contrast, the European Court of Human rights, in its judgments on cases involving
torture, holds no requirements as to the perpetrators and the motives, but all the cases it
was presented with so far involved only torture emanating from state policy203.
Also, the definition of torture in CAT explicitly excludes pain or suffering inherent to
lawful sanctions. This raises issues, as it could not have been intended in the CAT to
allow states to disguise torture as a lawful sanction204. Indications as to what could not be
excluded from the definition, even if labelled a ―lawful sanction‖, lies in the body of
decisions from the Committee Against Torture as well as reports of the UN Commission
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on Human Rights. They have named a number of specific actions that constitute torture
regardless of circumstances205. Examples include conduct such as extraction of nails,
burns, electric shock and deprivation of senses206.
This thesis is primarily concerned with situations where persecution is perpetrated by the
state. However, it also considers situations where the persecutor is unrelated to the state,
and the latter is unable to protect its national or resident. Instances of torture in the
context of organized crime or domestic violence could potentially fit within this scenario.
From the foregoing, it appears that such situations are excluded from the scope of article
3 of CAT. Freshwater uncovered that during the drafting of the CAT, the state parties
concluded that ―if torture is committed by a private actor, in normal circumstances, the
government of the home country should take responsibility for protecting its citizens and
punishing the perpetrators‖207. Apparently, ―[the] Convention was intended to deal with
the problem that arises when the authorities of a country are involved, a situation in
which the normal ―machinery of [...] prosecution and punishment‖ by the home
government might not operate to perform its responsibilities with respect to its
citizens‖208. Hence, domestic criminal law is expected to provide for the prosecution of
private offenders209.
This original intention of the drafters of CAT begs the question as to whether it is
possible to claim protection under article 3 CAT when the persecutor is unrelated to the
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state. If the public element is an absolute requirement, article 3 CAT only partially relates
to the concept of protection as herein defined, and does not provide complete protection.
The definition of torture in article 1 requires only ―consent or acquiescence‖210 of a
public official to the practice of torture for the convention to be triggered. The dictionary
definition of ―acquiescence‖ is ― to accept something reluctantly but without protest‖211.
This suggests that where the perpetrator of torture is not linked with the state, the practice
still amounts to torture when the state is aware of it, but fails to intervene. The UN
Committee Against Torture and other UN bodies have issued few comments on the
intended use of this word. One key comment from the UN Commission on Human rights
stated: ―A head of State, also in his or her capacity as commander-in-chief, should […]
not authorize his or her subordinates to use torture, or guarantee immunity to the authors
and co-authors of and accomplices to torture‖212. This statement supports the
interpretation of acquiescence as allowing torture to occur without necessarily instigating
it.
Accordingly, a United States Senate resolution stated that ―the term ‗acquiescence‘
requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness
of such activity and thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such
activity‖213. A study of the drafting of the definition also reveals that these words were
added for the purpose of encompassing acts that are tolerated by the state214. Such an
interpretation widens the personal scope of the CAT and makes it a legal basis for a
210
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personal claim for asylum motivated by another state‘s failure to protect, but it still
appears to exclude situations where a government acts but does not succeed in preventing
the risk of torture.
With all these considerations in mind, the following section is dedicated to a further
examination of the rationale behind the qualification of the CAT as a complementary
international protection instrument.
3.2.2. Qualification as Complementary Protection
If the CAT can be considered as a source for a complementary protection mechanism, it
is only as a result of a modern interpretation of this treaty, since it was initially designed
to expand on the general prohibition in article 5 UDHR and article 7 ICCPR and allow
for a more effective eradication of torture215. Its use as a complementary international
protection mechanism appears to stem more from the way it has been implemented in
some states and the political pressure it creates, rather than from the objective and text of
the treaty itself.
According to McAdam, the requirement of state complicity with torture in article 1 CAT
is one that limits the range of article 3 CAT as a source for international protection
claims216. The lack of clarity as to the lawful sanctions exception adds yet another dent
into that protection mechanism217. Hence, although the presence of this provision for nonrefoulement in the CAT can be considered as a statement in favour of the universality of
the principle, and an escape for victims of torture218, it does not accomplish this in and of
itself. Article 3 of CAT depends on actions undertaken by the state in order to be used as
215
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an independent mechanism of protection from the Refugee Convention. McAdam further
points out that this article‘s efficiency is dependent upon recognition of the competence
of the Committee Against Torture by state parties:
Unless a state has made a declaration under article 22 CAT219 recognizing the
competence of the Torture Committee to hear individual claims against the State, it
will be very difficult for a person to successfully invoke protection from refoulement
under article 3. Even if a State‘s obligations under other international treaties,
regional treaties, and customary international law prevent refoulement, the relief to
which an applicant will be entitled depends on the obligations which the State has
implemented domestically, and the mechanisms available for complaints to be
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brought220.
At this point, although 108 states have ratified the Convention, only 39 have made a
declaration pertaining to the competence of the Committee221.
Thus, it appears that article 3 of CAT becomes a mechanism for complementary
international protection by becoming a source for alternative protection mechanisms on
the domestic level and individual claims to the Committee Against torture. The latter is a
weaker source of protection, as the Committee‘s decisions are not binding on a State and
cannot be materially enforced.
The power of article 3 of CAT lies in the fact that it universalizes non-refoulement and
creates pressure for it to be upheld in domestic legislation. Similarly, the Committee‘s
decisions may still serve as public denunciations of non-compliance with the Convention,
and as such, exert a level of political pressure on the states involved. Gorlick remarks that
―[not] only has the Committee been able to prevent the refoulement of individual asylum
seekers who are likely to be subject to torture, but through its State party reporting
procedure some States have been prompted to re-examine their laws and practices related
to refugee protection‖222. His scrutiny of the structure of the Committee‘s decisions on
article 3 CAT brought him to the conclusion that the reasoning behind them is similar to
refugee status determination decisions at the domestic level223. He also raises concerns as
to the cases that were turned away by the Committee due to a strict application of the
rules contained in article 22 CAT224. It may be due to a legitimate concern that the
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Committee is not meant to be an international appeal board for refugees225, but it also
means that the success of article 3 of CAT as a complementary protection mechanism
truly depends on domestic implementation among the state parties.
3.2.3. Exclusions
Beyond the limitations inherent in the definition of torture under the CAT, and those
related to the refugee definition underlying article 33 of the Refugee Convention, there is
an ongoing doctrinal discussion on exclusions to the principle. Article 3 of CAT is
absolute, and non-refoulement contains no exclusions. However, the Refugee Convention
defines situations where people are excluded from relying on the right to nonrefoulement. I have previously mentioned the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of
torture. Making sense of the debate on whether non-refoulement may also be considered
a jus cogens international rule will be primordial for evaluating the extent of Canada‘s
obligations with regards to this principle.
Jean Allain considers that the only way to make sure that states never return any person
to another state where they face a risk of torture is to demonstrate that non-refoulement,
like torture itself, is a jus cogens norm in international law, one which carries no
exclusions226. He does so by examining state practice, more specifically ― [the] practice
of States in not forcibly repatriating refugees must […] be shown to be based on the
belief (opinio juris) that they themselves are bound by a legal obligation not to do so, and
that such an obligation is binding on them as a matter of jus cogens‖227. Using many
examples of the affirmation of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm in customary
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international law, while downplaying the importance of violations of the rule, Allain
insists that non-refoulement is indeed a rule without exceptions228.
Although Allain‘s view is based on highly detailed research and analysis, it considers
only the refugee protection regime, and the right of non-refoulement of refugee
claimants. It demonstrates that the identification of ―safe third countries‖229 may easily
lead to refoulement of refugees by limiting their ability to make claims230, but it fails to
consider the expressly stated exclusions in article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention and
how they, in fact, may lead to refoulement231. Neither does his argument include a
discussion on the existence of exceptions to non-refoulement as applied in article 3 of
CAT. In spite of the importance of customary international law in determining a state‘s
obligations, it is important to consider that written exclusions might be integrated into
international legal instruments, and to evaluate to what extent states may avail themselves
of such exclusions.
There are two exclusions in article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, which are evaluated
with respect to the country of asylum. The first is that there are reasonable grounds for
believing the person to be a danger to the country in which they seek asylum, and the
second is that the claimant has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
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serious crime. The two are separate and alternative232. The threshold necessary to
consider the refugee as a threat to the security of the country is considered by scholars to
be very high. For example, Bruin and Wouters state:
Although Article 33 (2) Refugee Convention does not specify the facts and
circumstances that constitute a danger to the national security and leaves a margin of
appreciation for States, the Article does demand a level of risk substantiated by proof.
The threshold is high. It applies to persons who try to overthrow the government by
force or other illegal means, who are endangering the constitution, the territorial
integrity, the independence or the peace of the country of refuge.233
Examples of serious crimes for which conviction leads to exclusion mentioned by
drafters of the Refugee Convention include rape, homicide, armed robbery and arson234,
and the criminal conviction must result from a final judgment. A claimant may also be
denied refugee status through the exceptions in article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention235.
The latter requires a lower standard of proof, but the claimant must be believed to have
committed a serious non-political crime, a war crime or acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations236. Duffy qualifies these exclusions in the following
manner.
[The] stipulated exclusions are extremely limited and were meant to target only those
who had committed an ‗indisputably wrong act‘, extraditable criminals, or in 1(F)(a)
those who are believed to have committed, ‗a crime against humanity, as defined in
the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
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crimes'.237
As such, these exceptions should only apply to a relatively small subset of asylum
seekers.
The above grounds for refoulement are in apparent contradiction to the formulation of
non-refoulement in article 3 of CAT, which contains no explicit exclusions. Scholars
affirm that its main feature is that it is absolute and non-derogable238. Indeed, the
Committee Against Torture has stated that the principle of non-refoulement, when it
comes to torture, applies even to those associated with terrorism239. This view also
benefits from some scholarly support. Duffy states:
It could be argued that non-refoulement is a fundamental component of the customary
prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
With 90 per cent of the world's sovereign states party to a treaty which prohibits
refoulement in some shape or form, does this sufficiently establish the normative
status of non-refoulement in international law? The incorporation of this principle
into key international instruments is also testament to consistent practice and a strong
opinio juris which contributes to the creation of a customary norm240.
The qualification of non-refoulement as a strong component of the prohibition on torture
implies that this prohibition cannot be respected as jus cogens if refoulement to states that
practice torture persists. The link between non-refoulement and the prohibition on torture
makes a strong point for the jus cogens nature of non-refoulement.
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In order to reconcile the existence of exclusions in one of the instruments with the
absolute and non-derogable character of the other, it is possible to conclude that
exclusions are possible even when a person would fit the definition of refugee and face
persecution, as long as this persecution does not amount to torture. This opinion has
garnered support among scholars, some of whom also include other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment in the types of persecution that preclude
refoulement241. In cases where torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment are not involved, a balancing test between the risk of persecution faced by
the claimant and the risk the claimant potentially presents to the country of refuge may be
done by courts to determine if removal is allowed242.
Furthermore, states have been known to rely on diplomatic assurances that the asylum
seeker will not be subject to torture when returned to another state. This practice has been
submitted to the scrutiny of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment243. The
Rapporteur‘s report asserts that diplomatic assurances should not be used to get around
the absolute rule of non-refoulement. The main problem is the absence of certainty that
both parties are making the agreement in good faith and that it will not be breached.
There are no mechanisms to sanction such agreements and they are not legally binding244.
In addition, within a context of complementary international protection, a diplomatic
assurance may be given by a state that is willing to protect the individual, but still unable
241
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to do so. A person may be in need and deserving of protection by the state of asylum
despite a diplomatic assurance. This, and all other foregoing considerations with regards
to non-refoulement will be assessed against Canadian domestic law to see if it is in tune
with its international obligations as a state of asylum.
3.3.Integration into Canadian Law
3.3.1. Inclusion of Non-Refoulement within Canadian Legislation
One object of this thesis is to apply the international obligations sketched out in the
previous section to Canadian domestic law, with a view to evaluating our state‘s
compliance with the treaty obligations it set out to uphold. Having ratified both the
Refugee Convention245 and the Convention Against Torture246, Canada has undeniable
obligations to respect the principle of non-refoulement, both towards refugees and other
persons seeking protection. I have discussed the principle of non-refoulement as
articulated in both international instruments in order to better assess the concept itself, but
this section is concerned with the inclusion of the non-refoulement obligations under the
CAT into alternative protection mechanisms in Canada.
Although not explicitly written as such, section 97 IRPA is arguably an embodiment of
non-refoulement in Canadian law247. The existing scholarly analysis of this section is
very limited, but it does suggest it is the main legislative expression of complementary
international protection in this country. At this point, it might be helpful to reiterate the
text of section 97 IRPA.
245
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97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their
country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning
of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.
At first glance, subsection 97(1)(a) contains all the elements of the principle of nonrefoulement, as it precludes the return of an individual to a country where they face
torture within the meaning of article 1 of CAT. This rule thus carries the same limitations
on state-related perpetrators and lawful sanctions, as the CAT itself.
I have observed earlier that the Canadian delegation had expressed disappointment as to
the fact that cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment had been excluded
from article 3 of CAT, which establishes the absolute principle of non-refoulement. It is
consistent with this sentiment that non-refoulement in subsection 97(1)(b) expands to a
risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Subsection 97(1)(b)(iii) also
mirrors the definition of torture in CAT by including the limitation related to lawful
75

sanctions. However, new limitations are added through subsections 97(1)(b)(ii) and
97(1)(b)(iv), which require that the risk be personalized and that it not be caused by the
inability of the country to provide adequate healthcare.
Interestingly, subsection 97(1)(b)(i) rejects the limitation as to state actors, opting instead
to call for proof that the other state be unable or unwilling to protect the claimant. In
doing so, it clearly and explicitly makes the concept of ―person in need of protection‖
analogous to the definition of refugee, by integrating the concept of protection as it is
seen in international refugee law. On the other hand, nowhere in subsection 97(1) is there
mention of non-refoulement or article 3 of CAT, which contains this rule and proclaims
its peremptory nature. Non-refoulement is only explicitly guaranteed by Canadian
legislation once a claim has been processed and protection granted248. It is possible that
these references have been overlooked in order to avoid the absolute nature of nonrefoulement and to allow for exceptions regarding individuals whose status has yet to be
determined.
Hence, it appears that the idea behind section 97 IRPA was to integrate non-refoulement
as it is articulated in the Refugee Convention, while widening its personal scope and
using the CAT to clarify the notion of torture. This interpretation is strengthened by the
text of section 98 IRPA which states that ―[a] person referred to in section E or F of
Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of
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protection‖249. It is possible that these sections have been chosen because they allow
rejection of claimants without assessment of their refugee or protection claims. This
contrasts with paragraph 33(2), which allows for the exclusion of claimants after
assessment of their claims if their prolonged stay in the country of refuge presents a
threat250.
Hathaway and Harvey have extensively analyzed the article 1(E) and 1(F) exclusions that
are mentioned in section 98 IRPA. They warn against the use of the article 1(F) exclusion
on serious criminality, arguing that ―in relying on the peremptory Article 1(F) procedure
to deny refugee status for safety and security reasons that are relevant only to an
application to authorize refoulement under Article 33(2), governments contravene
international refugee law‖251. They suggest that governments may be tempted to apply
only the article 1(E) or article 1(F) exclusions, and to apply it to a wider range of criminal
offences than it is allowed by international refugee law. They explain the importance of
meeting the procedural standards for the application of exclusions in these terms:
Governments are entitled to invoke an expansive range of concerns to justify a denial
of protection on the grounds of safety or security, but only if they are prepared to
meet the more demanding procedural requirements of Article 33(2). States that act
under Article 1(F) to vindicate safety and security interests effectively demand the
best of both worlds, denying the critical balance at the heart of the Refugee
249
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Convention between refugee rights and asylum-state interests252.
I return to this exclusion in the next subsection to determine if Canada has only applied
section 98 IRPA to serious criminals, as it should.
The only other provision similar to paragraph 33(2) of the Refugee Convention is section
115 IRPA253, which targets individuals already recognized as refugees and carries similar
exclusions on grounds of serious criminality. It is also labelled as the ―principle of nonrefoulement‖ within the Act. It is thus arguable that the Act meant to include nonrefoulement in its oldest sense, that is, non-removal of persons who already benefit from
refugee status, without applying it to other persons whose status determination is
pending. This section entitles the Minister to issue a ―danger opinion‖ on refugees who
possess a criminal record, which balances the level of risk the refugee represents for
Canadian society against the risk he faces if returned to his country of origin or
nationality254. If the former outweighs the latter, the refugee may be deported.
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3.3.2. Use of the Principle of Non-Refoulement in Canadian Case Law
Perhaps one of the most important ways of evaluating the extent of Canada‘s obligations
as well as compliance with these obligations, is to look into the legal opinions expressed
by domestic courts. In relation to the prohibition of refoulement to a state where there is a
risk of torture, the Suresh255 and Pushpanathan256 cases are fundamental, as they reflect
the Supreme Court‘s opinion on both Canada‘s international obligations, and the way
they should be implemented domestically.
In the Suresh case, the appellant had already gained refugee status and was facing
deportation due to his allegiance to an allegedly terrorist organization. His contention was
that he would face torture if he were returned to Sri Lanka. Despite his having already
obtained refugee status in Canada, the reasoning of the Court with regards to nonrefoulement may be equally applicable to persons seeking protection in Canada.
Interestingly, the Court addresses the apparent contradiction between the exclusions in
the Refugee Convention and the peremptory nature of non-refoulement in the CAT, and
seems to conclude that the latter prevails. The Court thus presented its analysis of the
scope of the CAT:
It is not apparent to us that the clear prohibitions on torture in the CAT were intended
to be derogable. First, the absence of an express prohibition against derogation in Art.
3 of the CAT together with the "without prejudice" language of Art. 16257 do not
255
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seem to permit derogation. Nor does it follow from the assertion in Art. 2(2) of
CAT258 that "[n]o . . . exceptional circumstances . . . may be invoked as a justification
of torture," that the absence of such a clause in the Art. 3 refoulement provision
permits acts leading to torture in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the history of
Art. 16 of the CAT suggests that it was intended to leave the door open to other legal
instruments providing greater protection, not to serve as the means for reducing
protection. During the deliberations of the Working Group that drafted the CAT, Art.
16 was characterized as a "saving clause affirming the continued validity of other
instruments prohibiting punishments or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment":
Convention against Torture, travaux préparatoires, at p. 66. This undermines the
suggestion that Art. 16 can be used as a means of narrowing the scope of protection
that the CAT was intended to provide.259
Further on, the Court affirms, based on these arguments as well as recommendations
from the UN Committee Against Torture, that the CAT should be considered as the
prevailing international instrument over the Refugee Convention. It would indeed make
little sense to deny refugees rights that the CAT provides to all individuals without
discrimination260. From this, the Court reaches the conclusion that international law
prohibits deportation to torture regardless of national security interests261.
Following the Court‘s insightful analysis on the contradictions of international law on
non-refoulement, their analysis under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
opens the door to exclusions to that principle.
We conclude that generally to deport a refugee, where there are grounds to believe
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international
instrument or national law which prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which
relate to extradition or expulsion.‖
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that this would subject the refugee to a substantial risk of torture, would
unconstitutionally violate the Charter's s. 7 guarantee of life, liberty and security of
the person. This said, we leave open the possibility that in an exceptional case such
deportation might be justified either in the balancing approach under ss. 7 or 1 of the
Charter.262
This particular passage has been the subject of vehement criticism263. One of the voices
that rose up against it is the UN Committee Against Torture, which expressed concern at
the Court‘s failure to recognize the absolute nature of the principle of non-refoulement in
this case264. In the Committee‘s opinion, no deportation to torture can be justified under
section 1265 or 7266 of the Charter, which makes the Court‘s analysis an open door to
violations of international law.
The Court‘s reasoning may be linked with the UNHCR‘s involvement as an intervener in
the Suresh case267. Its participation was justified by its mandate in overseeing the
application of treaties relating to refugees. In the factum submitted to the Supreme Court
of Canada, the UNHCR emphasizes the need to apply the Refugee Convention along with
the Convention Against Torture and ICCPR, thus underlining the interplay between
refugee law and human rights. The UNHCR contends that an interpretation of
international law is the key to interpreting domestic law within this case268. The High
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Commissioner‘s factum recognizes that the prohibition on refoulement in article 3(1) of
CAT is absolute, while that of article 33 of the Refugee Convention contains exclusion.
However, it puts forth the idea that the CAT prevails on the Refugee Convention, based
on three arguments. The first reason is the fact that it was ratified later269. Also, the
factum states that treaties are to be interpreted in accordance with the evolving
international human rights context270, and finally, that article 5 of the Refugee
Convention opens to more benefits being allotted to individuals through other treaties271.
However, through an application of the proportionality test 272 developed in the Oakes273
case, the UNHCR concludes: ―refoulement can only be justified under article 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention if there is a very serious threat to the security of the country of
refuge that is proportional to the risk faced by the refugee upon refoulement‖274. The
UNHCR‘s position could thus have been the basis for the Supreme Court‘s decision to

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), 8 March 2001, online: UNHCR Refworld
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3e71bbe24.html> [UNHCR Factum].
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allow for the application of this rule and allow for exceptions to non-refoulement275. In
addition, section 1 of the Charter is only used to save any section 7 violation in
exceptional circumstances. Also, the UNHCR‘s brief does not account for the court‘s
opinion that exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement can be created through the
fundamental justice balance in section 7 as well as under section 1 of the Charter.
The other Supreme Court case worth mentioning in an analysis of complementary
protection based on non-refoulement is Pushpanathan. Of particular interest in this case
is the Court‘s majority opinion on the difference between article 33 of the Refugee
Convention and article 1F of the same Convention.
Article 1F(b) contains a balancing mechanism in so far as the specific adjectives
"serious" and "non-political" must be satisfied, while Article 33(2) as implemented in
the Act by ss. 53 and 19276 provides for weighing of the seriousness of the danger
posed to Canadian society against the danger of persecution upon refoulement. This
approach reflects the intention of the signatory states to create a humanitarian balance
between the individual in fear of persecution on the one hand, and the legitimate
concern of states to sanction criminal activity on the other. The presence of Article
1F(b) suggests that even a serious non-political crime such as drug trafficking should
not be included in Article 1F(c). This is consistent with the expression of opinion of
the delegates in the Collected Travaux Préparatoires of the 1951 Geneva Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, vol. III, 86, at p. 89.277
Hence, it would appear that article 1(F) distinguishes itself from article 33 by adding
criteria to the process of determining whether a person is a refugee or a person in need of
protection. Since the status granted to both categories of claimants under IRPA is the
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same278, it would appear logical to create an alternative protection mechanism without
compromising on the requirement that the protected person cannot be a persecutor.
Adversely, article 33 would be concerned with the refoulement of refugees (or protected
persons, since they benefit from the same legal status) once protection has been granted.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to analyze section 97
IRPA‘s compliance with Canada‘s international obligation of non-refoulement. The
Federal Court has nevertheless made a brief statement on the relationship between section
97 IRPA and article 3 CAT.
Paragraph 97(1)(a) of the Act refers specifically to the notion of torture contained in
Article 1 of the Convention and therefore integrates the principles contained in
Article 3 of the Convention. Consequently, the answer to this question is contained in
the law itself and does not require certification.279
This statement has then been incorporated into subsequent judgments by the federal
court280. It reflects a position that had been adopted before the enactment of section 97
IRPA, according to which article 3 of CAT is only concerned with individuals who have
278
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gone through the determination process and have been denied refugee status281. In
practice, this means that claimants who are denied a hearing to decide whether they are
refugees or persons in need of protection, based on the exclusions of section 98, cannot
claim that their right to non-refoulement has been violated.
Hence, the right to non-refoulement is almost absolute, as determined in the Suresh case,
for persons who are allowed to present their refugee claims. However, courts have found
that it can be subject to exceptions in the context of pre-removal risk assessment
(PRRA)282. PRRA is a process by which a person may apply for protection when they are
about to be returned283, and the determination of risk is made based on the criteria in
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85

sections 96 to 98 IRPA284. There are also circumstances under which the application for
protection may only result in stay of removal, such as serious criminality or a violation of
human rights285. The Federal Court‘s opinion in Xie is that individuals excluded under
section 98 IRPA, which provides for rejection based on article 1(F) of the Refugee
Convention, can make a claim for protection under section 112 and obtain stay of
removal, but they are meant to be rejected from refugee protection286. This opinion was
followed and referred to with approbation in several other cases287. This means that a
person who is excluded under section 98 IRPA can demonstrate that they should not be
returned, but they are not allowed protection as herein defined.
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From these observations, it appears that the Federal Court is trying to minimize Canada‘s
international obligations in order to reconcile them with the structure of the IRPA, rather
than reassess the validity of the IRPA as part of an international legal framework. The
Supreme Court judgments in Suresh and Pushpanathan are also flawed as they open to
the possibility of individuals being returned to torture. They were based on legislation
which was repealed with the adoption of the new IRPA in 2001, but these findings have
not been readjusted by the Federal Court in light of the legislative reform and the
adoption of sections 97 and 98 IRPA, which have added new protection provisions. This
adds difficulty to the interpretation and application of these new provisions.
From this analysis of the implementation of the prohibition on torture and refoulement in
the IRPA, this thesis now turns to the examination of how civil and political rights
generally impact on traditional and alternative protection mechanisms.
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Chapter 4.

General Protection Based on Civil and Political Rights

Classic refugee protection is a palliative regime, which appears to draw inspiration from
civil and political rights as it expands from the non-discrimination provision in article 2
of the UDHR288, to a measure preventing persecution based on discriminatory grounds289.
Just as article 2 was meant to guarantee all other rights contained in the UDHR
irrespective of civil and political status, the Refugee Convention aims to guarantee the
possibility to reside in a state which guarantees core rights to persons of all races,
religions, nationalities, political opinions or social groups. In spite of this apparent
connection between refugee protection and civil and political rights, there may be
persisting protection gaps between the 1951 Refugee Convention and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which entered into force in 1976. This chapter
identifies such protection gaps, and finds out if and to what extent the ICCPR can be used
as a complementary protection mechanism.
Although I have dealt extensively with the principle of non-refoulement in Chapter 3, the
CAT is not the only instrument that guarantees it. Therefore, in the first section, I
examine which rights in the ICCPR are applicable to refugees, starting with nonrefoulement and how its scope differs from that in CAT. I then examine other refugeespecific rights contained in the ICCPR. I conclude the first section by examining a few
regional human rights and refugee protection instruments and making sense of them in
light of civil and political rights. This sets up the framework for the second and last
288

Article 2 UDHR: ―Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
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Refugee Studies 112 at 120-121.
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section, in which I look at how the ICCPR is interpreted in light of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms and the IRPA, as well as in specific case law regarding refugee
protection and removal orders.
4.1.Refugee-Specific Rights in the ICCPR
4.1.1. Non-Refoulement through the ICCPR
Most discussions of the principle of non-refoulement include article 7 ICCPR290. It
provides for a general prohibition of torture, but makes no explicit mention of asylum or
the principle of non-refoulement. The link to non-refoulement has been created by case
law and opinions from the Human Rights Committee, which is the implementing body of
the Covenant. Interestingly, the Committee has recognized that return to a country where
an individual faces a risk of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment would be contrary to provisions of the ICCPR in two important cases out of
Canada.
In Ng v. Canada291, the applicant faced extradition to the United States, where he was
likely to be subject to the death penalty by asphyxiation. In this situation, the Committee
decided that the treatment he was likely to be subjected to was in violation of article 7
ICCPR, and therefore challenged the legality of the extradition from which this treatment
would result. In Judge v. Canada292, however, no violation of article 7 was recognized,
but the Committee concluded that the extradition of the claimant to face the death penalty
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in the United States would violate the right to life embodied in article 6 ICCPR293. It is
not clear from such interpretations that they translate into asylum mechanisms, but it has
been argued that the adoption of the CAT cemented the ICCPR as a basis for protection
claims294.
Wouters argues that article 2(1) ICCPR295 enables the principle of non-refoulement
contained in articles 6 and 7 ICCPR by outlining a far reaching personal scope for the
rights contained in the Covenant. The absence of limitations as to the legal, political or
social status opens to the possibility of protection from refoulement to individuals who do
not benefit from refugee status296. From this reasoning, it becomes plausible that these
articles of the ICCPR may be used to protect persons without distinctions.
The territorial scope of article 2(1) remains limited by the addition of the words ―within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction‖, which were interpreted in light of the object of
the Covenant and with a view to avoid absurd results in the application of the Covenant
293

Article 6 ICCPR: ―1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the
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rights as referring to individuals within the state party‘s territory or subject to its
jurisdiction297. For asylum seekers, this means that their rights should be protected by the
country where they seek refuge. The Human Rights Committee also remains a strong
source for the interpretation of the territorial scope of the Covenant298. In relation to nonrefoulement, Wouters summarizes the Committee‘s opinion and its implications.
According to the Committee, while States are responsible for guaranteeing the rights
of the Covenant to all individuals under their control when it comes to the prohibition
on refoulement the State has an obligation only not to remove those individuals from
within its territory. This would imply that no obligations exist towards people who are
not within the State party‘s territory. This would, for example, exclude individuals
who were at the de facto border of the States [and] individuals seeking asylum at the
embassy of the State party […].299
According to Wouters, these examples may be considered as situations where the state
party has effective control over the individuals, and as such, may qualify as instances
where the state has jurisdiction. However, this argument is not explicitly accounted for by
the official sources of interpretation for the Covenant300. Nonetheless, one may conclude
that Canada has an undeniable obligation to uphold the rights defined in articles 6 and 7
ICCPR as well as an obligation not to put these rights at risk by returning individuals to a
country where they are threatened.
In terms of the material scope of the protection from refoulement derived from the
ICCPR, the most eye-catching feature is that article 7 ICCPR prevents both torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As such, it is said to widen the
297
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material scope of article 3 CAT301. According to the HRC, ―[it] is the duty of the State
party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be
necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in
their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity‖ 302. Because
of article 7, the ICCPR can even be said to be complementary within the realm of
complementary international protection. It strengthens and adds substance to
complementary protection mechanisms by forging far-reaching fundamental rights and
principles.
McAdam, however, takes a somewhat contrary position and argues that the ICCPR is
―the least suitable instrument for complementary protection‖303. She considers that
―[although] some ICCPR rights are [relatively] expansive, and the HRC‘s proceedings
are comparatively shorter and its views simpler, these do not outweigh its restrictive
evidence, inconsistent reasoning, and the fact that it has considered comparatively few
removal cases‖304. She comes to this conclusion by setting it against the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a status-granting regional instrument.
This rejection of the ICCPR as a complementary international protection mechanism
because of the flawed procedure of its implementing body and its inability to grant status
appears to be inconsistent with her assessment of the CAT, which she qualifies as a
complementary protection mechanism. Although the Committee attached to the CAT
seems to be more effective and the subject of less criticism, the fact that it has high
301
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requirements to hear a case strongly suggests that it is not meant to be the main recourse
for individuals seeking relief under the CAT. The HRC presumably serves a similar
purpose as a last resort when state jurisdictions do not recognize violations of ICCPRbased rights.
The HRC has also issued a series of general comments on the interpretation and
application of the ICCPR, one of which makes a statement on the principle of nonrefoulement.
[The] article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Covenant
rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails an
obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their
territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either
in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the
person may subsequently be removed. The relevant judicial and administrative
authorities should be made aware of the need to ensure compliance with the Covenant
obligations in such matters.305
The Committee then goes on to specify that the domestic legislation of the state parties
should be made to comply with this principle and to give effect to other ICCPR rights306.
Additionally, in case of discrepancy between the national and international laws,
domestic legislation should be adjusted to fit into the ICCPR framework307.
As such, both treaties prevent refoulement, but do not create a status resulting from nonrefoulement. The CAT only goes further than the ICCPR in stating the prohibition of
refoulement in explicit terms. They both depend on state parties to create such status and
305
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implement stronger domestic provisions to strengthen these international human rights. In
my view, both instruments can be qualified as complementary international protection
instruments that depend upon the creation of alternative protection mechanisms on the
domestic level in order to be fully effective.
4.1.2. Other Refugee-Specific Rights in the ICCPR
Non-refoulement may be a strong source of complementary international protection, but
it is not the only one. If other rights are taken into consideration in conjunction with that
of non-refoulement, the ICCPR becomes not only an additional basis for protection, but
also sets minimum standards for the rights granted to protection seekers. This section is
dedicated to a discussion of refugee-specific rights other than non-refoulement in the
ICCPR.
Of particular interest to protection-seekers are articles 12308 and 13309 ICCPR, which
pertain to the rights of aliens. They allow aliens who are lawfully in the territory of a state
to benefit from liberty of movement, and the right not to be expelled unless there are
public security concerns. In its general comment on the position of aliens under the
Covenant, the Committee has reaffirmed that aliens benefit from all the rights contained
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the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
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explusion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent au
thority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.‖
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in the Covenant, barring a few exceptions, based on article 2 ICCPR310, which provides
for the application of rights without discrimination to individuals within the state‘s
jurisdiction. I have previously outlined article 2 ICCPR as the key to the principle of nonrefoulement, but it opens the door to the application of a plethora of other rights for
aliens, which include protection seekers.
The right to enter a territory that is recognized in article 12 ICCPR is limited by states‘
local legislation, as indicated by the word ―lawfully‖. The HRC adds a few exceptions to
this seemingly clear rule of state prerogative.
The Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory
of a State party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide whom it will admit
to its territory. However, in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection
of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when
considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect
for family life arise.311
This statement confirms once again the principle of non-refoulement, but adds two new
considerations of great importance for aliens. The idea of respect for family life will be
explored in greater detail in chapter 6. Considerations of non-discrimination are the most
pivotal for this section. They imply that aliens who find themselves within the territory
and jurisdiction of the state, and thus under the impetus of article 2, benefit from a
number of fundamental rights regardless of how they entered the territory. Because these
rights are guaranteed by the host state, it can be said to create a certain form of protection
for persons seeking asylum in this state.
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Aliens‘ right to non-discrimination in the Covenant applies to all rights but those
specifically relating to citizens. Some rights also explicitly mention the prohibition of
discrimination, such as article 26 ICCPR, which guarantees equality before the law312.
Aliens also benefit from basic rights such as the right to life, liberty and security of the
person as well as the freedom of thought, conscience and religion 313. However, the
Committee‘s opinion is not entirely clear as to the extent to which all these rights apply to
aliens who are not lawfully within the territory of the state.
The right to procedural fairness for aliens is particularly strengthened by article 13
ICCPR, which provides that expulsion or removal cannot be executed without a fair
decision in accordance with domestic law. However, this right is only afforded to aliens
who enter the territory lawfully, thus excluding large numbers of asylum seekers. In that
sense, the rights contained in the Covenant are not quite refugee-specific as they do not
take into direct consideration the possibility that a person entering illegally may present a
claim for protection, unlike the Refugee Convention in its article 31 314. Nonetheless, the
interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement as having a wide scope may complete
the gap in article 13 and allow for the elimination of distinctions between aliens based on
the legality of their presence.
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All in all, none of the rights guaranteed to aliens in the Covenant appear as strong and
far-reaching as that of non-refoulement, but they do provide aliens with fundamental
guarantees against discrimination and a certain level of procedural fairness. From this, we
may conclude that the ICCPR aims to set basic standards for domestic protection regimes
without becoming a mechanism for protection in itself or granting a specific status.
Further, non-refoulement is the only truly preventive right in the Covenant, other rights
only being enforceable if a violation occurs. Hence, the rights of aliens under the
Covenant are not refugee-specific rights as defined in chapter 2, but they encompass
some or all of protection seekers through their general formulation.
4.1.3. Implementation of Refugee-Specific Rights in Regional International
Instruments
The preceding interpretation of ICCPR rights in relation to asylum seekers reveals that
the Covenant sets standards for domestic asylum regimes while reaffirming and
expanding the principle of refoulement. Since it cannot be used as an independent
complementary protection mechanism, it would be pertinent to examine how it relates to
regional international instruments, as such agreements reflect the consensus of a group of
states and thus form a part of international law while portraying a more specific
interpretation of ICCPR obligations.
The ICCPR‘s prohibition on refoulement is very similar to that in article 3 315 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 316. This article merely prohibits torture
and inhuman treatment or punishment, but the European Convention enforcing body, the
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European Court of Human rights, has established in its case law that returning a person to
a country where they face such harm would be a breach of article 3 of ECHR 317. The
jurisprudence of the Court has recognized and reaffirmed the absolute nature of nonrefoulement, thus rendering the ECHR equivalent to the CAT in its prohibition of
refoulement.
As homologous as this prohibition might seem to the interpretation of the ICCPR by the
HRC, it is considered as a significantly stronger source of complementary protection due
to the higher efficiency and consistency of its implementing body318. More than a simple
criticism of the ICCPR, the functional superiority of such a regional instrument reinforces
the idea that the principles in an aspiring universal international instrument cannot be
realized without domestic or regional implementation.
The Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU
Convention) was adopted in the same decade as the ICCPR. It reiterates the Refugee
Convention definition319, but also extends the meaning of the term ―refugee‖. It defines
the term thusly:
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public
order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside
his country of origin or nationality.320
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This expansion of the definition of refugee allows for individuals to seek asylum when
public security is severely compromised by civil strife or armed conflicts. It recognizes
that in certain situations, people may fall victim to persecution on a random basis, and
that the right to life321 is not fulfilled if such persons are not allowed to seek the
protection of neighbouring states. It also recognizes the risk that torture or cruel treatment
may be inflicted on an arbitrary basis on account of such disturbances of public order,
thus respecting article 7 ICCPR.
The definition weaves in elements of the principle of non-refoulement, as persons who
are at a substantial risk to their life benefit from the protection of the African Convention
as refugees. This convention further solidifies the principle of non-refoulement by
prohibiting rejection at the frontier322 and compelling states of the Organization of the
African Unity (OAU) to ensure, to the best of their ability, the settlement of individuals
who fit into this expanded definition of refugee323.
Interestingly, article 3 of the OAU Convention prohibits refugees from engaging in
various forms of ―subversive‖ activity in addition to the obligation to conform to the
asylum country‘s laws and regulations. These activities include causing or aggravating
tension through the media, which is an acknowledgment that protection in times of
political instability comes at the cost of political freedom and freedom of speech 324. This
concern with the minimization of refugee-related political tension is also reflected in
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article 2(2), which prohibits states from considering the admission of refugees as a hostile
act325.
These provisions demonstrate awareness of the political echo that comes with the
granting of asylum. It is hardly surprising, since the history of asylum abounds with
examples of states using diplomatic protection for individuals sought after because of
their political activity as a statement in favour of said activity. I have mentioned
examples of this in chapter 2. The African Convention marks an evolution of refugee
protection as a humanitarian issue. Nevertheless, the political repercussions are likely the
main reasons all states have not expanded the refugee definition to include victims of
generalized political instability. Also, many states may be reluctant to limit freedom of
expression to guarantee the purely humanitarian nature of refugee protection.
The latest relevant regional instrument is the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. It
was adopted at a colloquium entitled ―Coloquio Sobre la Proteccíon Internacional de los
Refugiados en América Central, México y Panamá: Problemas Jurídicos y
Humanitarios‖, and represents an example of cooperation between Central American
states. This non-binding instrument calls for the adoption and implementation of the 1951
Refugee Convention and cooperation with the UNHCR326, while promoting a focus on
the roots of refugee problems327 and reaffirming the humanitarian nature of refugee
protection with a view to limit political tensions while respecting refugees‘ human
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rights328. The Colloquium‘s conclusions take example from the OAU Convention
concerning the expansion of the refugee definition329, the reaffirmation of the absolute
nature of non-refoulement330, and maintaining the purely humanitarian nature of refugee
protection331. On the down side, this document produces no strict legal obligation upon
the participating states.
This presentation of regional refugee protection instruments in conjunction with the
ICCPR shows that in practice it has been less likely for a universal binding treaty such as
the latter to serve as an independent asylum mechanism. It is a source of many principles
and the rights it contains could clearly be better protected by an expansion of the 1951
refugee definition. The aforementioned regional instruments are better geared towards the
specific needs of individuals seeking protection, be it with stronger enforcement
mechanisms like the ECHR, or by being centred specifically around refugee and asylum
issues, as is the case of the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration. Hence the
ICCPR may serve as a source of inspiration for principles of complementary protection,
328
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but it relies mostly on regional and domestic measures to ensure that all the human rights
it guarantees are, indeed, respected in the context of displacement.
4.2.Implementation in Canadian Law and Policy
4.2.1. Human Rights Law in Canadian Immigration and Constitutional Law
Officially, international instruments to which Canada is a party are not binding until they
are implemented into domestic law332. An obvious example of such implementation in
our field of interest is article 96 IRPA, which recites the exact text of the article 1(A)(2)
Refugee Convention definition, or article 97 IRPA, which makes direct reference to
article 1 of the CAT. Although the ICCPR has not been subject to such implementation, it
is undeniable that its principles have coloured the Canadian Charter333. This sub-section
examines the application of the ICCPR in cases dealing with the Charter and more
specifically, those dealing with Charter rights in relation to asylum. First, I further
examine the right to non-refoulement in the Suresh334 and Burns335 cases, as well as in
section 97 IRPA, and then discuss the problematic application of the principles of
fundamental justice in relation to the right to present a claim for protection.
Bassan has conducted a study of cases relating to the Charter, which reveals that
international human rights treaties are routinely used by the Courts when they are asked
to review the constitutionality of domestic laws. She recognizes the theoretical
differences between implemented and unimplemented treaties, but argues, in light of the
332
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body of court cases considering the Charter, that the judicial use of international human
rights law has tended to overlook those differences336. Her analysis of Charter-related
case law reveals that the recourse to international human rights instruments by courts
does not obey any specific rules and is therefore unpredictable337. ―Thus, the willingness
to consider international conventional law is not impeded by the constitutional rule that
unimplemented treaties are not part of the domestic law of Canada‖338. Rather, there
seems to be a presumption in the interpretation of Canadian law that the legislator does
not intend to violate international law instruments, which results in the frequent use of the
ICCPR and ECHR by the Supreme Court339.
In the Suresh case340, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the deportation of
an individual to a country where they face a risk of torture is, in most cases, incompatible
with principles of fundamental justice.
Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a person where there are substantial grounds to
believe he or she would be tortured on return, this is not because Art. 3 of the CAT
directly constrains the actions of the Canadian government, but because the
fundamental justice balance under s. 7 of the Charter generally precludes deportation
to torture when applied on a case-by-case basis. We may predict that it will rarely be
struck in favour of expulsion where there is a serious risk of torture. However, as the
matter is one of balance, precise prediction is elusive.341
This passage reveals that the Court considers deportation to face torture illegal in light of
the constitution and rejects Canada‘s obligations under international law as a source for
this prohibition. The Court does not recognize that the Charter constitutes the domestic
336
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implementation of human rights such as the right to life and security of the person. The
wording of the Court‘s opinion and, more specifically, the use of the word ―directly‖,
suggest that international law still indirectly constrains the actions of the Canadian
government.
Furthermore, the previously mentioned extradition cases before the human rights
committee are similar to the Burns case342 before the Supreme Court. It involved the
constitutional analysis of the extradition of the respondents, two murder suspects, to the
state of Washington, without prior assurance that they would not be subjected to the
death penalty. In this case, the Court considers the prohibition of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment under section 12 of the Charter, but it makes no mention of the
influence of the same prohibition in the ICCPR. The Ng decision343 considered the
method employed to carry out the death penalty, asphyxiation, as part of the reasons why
it constitutes cruel punishment, but the Supreme Court has not considered this factor in
this case. It decides that the decision should not be made under section 12, but under the
balancing process of the principles of fundamental justice in section 7344 and under the
section 1 proportionality test. The Court found that extradition without assurances that
capital punishment would not be imposed violated the respondents' rights under section 7
of the Charter345 and could not be justified under section 1346. Despite ruling in favour of
the respondents, the Court fails to consider ICCPR rights and HRC decisions in its
discussion of the case. It, nonetheless, recognizes that Canadian principles of

342

Burns, supra note 335.
Ng, supra note 291.
344
Burns, supra note 335 ¶ 57.
345
Ibid. ¶ 132.
346
Ibid. ¶ 143.
343

104

fundamental justice have evolved since the domestic adjudication of the Ng case, and that
they now go against the constitutionality of extradition to face the death penalty.
Notably, it can be said that paragraph 97(2) IRPA implements the non-refoulement
obligations contained in the ICCPR, as it extends the principle to individuals who face a
risk of cruel, unusual or inhuman treatment or punishment347. I have already pointed out
that, in doing so, it goes further than the obligations set out for parties to the CAT.
Further, procedural rights and equality before the law of aliens who are not refugees, as
defined in articles 13 and 26 of ICCPR, are also guaranteed by section 97 of IRPA. Like
claims made under section 96 of IRPA, persons in need of protection go through a
hearing process before an IRB member.
Overall, the Canadian legislation appears to be influenced by the principles contained in
the ICCPR in matters relating to international protection, but there is no explicit reference
to it in the IRPA or the Charter. Paragraphs 2(b), (c) and (e) IRPA acknowledge in
general terms Canada‘s ―humanitarian ideals‖, ―international obligations‖, as well as its
commitment to ―human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings‖ without
explicit mention of any human rights protection instrument348. The ICCPR is more likely
to be continuously used as an interpretive tool in asylum case law, as a result of the
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presumption that Canadian legislation is consistent with international treaties to which
Canada is a party349.
In addition, part of the UNHCR‘s and states‘ obligations outlined by the UN General
Assembly is to partake in agreements and cooperate in order to reduce the number of
people needing protection. Canada‘s acknowledgement of these further obligations is
seen primarily through the adoption of various policies, and not through law. For
example, Canada has implemented a resettlement program that ―places emphasis on the
protection of refugees and people in refugee-like situations by providing a durable
solution to persons in need of resettlement‖350. These refugee-like situations include
violations of human rights as a result of war, or other generalized massive violations of
human rights, in conformity with the definitions of Humanitarian-Protected Abroad
Classes351.
This program allows for assistance for a predetermined number of individuals, in addition
to applications for private sponsorships352. It provides resettlement for individuals
referred by the UNHCR or by private sponsors, and comprises an ―Urgent Protection
Program‖ which responds to requests by the UNHCR for the protection of individuals
who face an immediate threat to their life353. Other measures are targeted at refugees with
special needs such as women or children354.
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This policy is a notable example of the influence of human rights on Canada‘s asylum
regime is the country‘s general cooperation with the UNHCR. This collaboration is tied
to some provisions in the IRPA regulations, but is not part of the IRPA itself. It allows
protection for persons who may not be able to make the journey to Canada to present a
claim for themselves, and opens to new refugee-like situations, such as violations of
human rights in situations of armed conflict. As such, it presents an alternative protection
option, which conforms with Canada‘s humanitarian commitments. However, it remains
limited when it comes to the wider protection of social, economic and cultural rights, and
does not present a program of assistance for victims of natural disasters, an issue that I
will discuss further in chapter 5.
4.2.2. The Right to a Full Hearing and Access to State Territory
The Charter makes clear distinctions between individuals who benefit from a status and
those who do not, as section 6, regarding freedom of movement, refers to citizens and
permanent residents, while sections 2 and 7 to 14 extend protection of fundamental rights
to everyone355. At the time of Bassan‘s study, which was before the last legislative reform
of the IRPA, the Supreme Court had already issued its decision in the Singh356 case. This
case was the first example of refugee claimants who had failed in their claim, but argued
that their removal would be a violation of section 7 of the Charter, which generally
mirrors articles 6 and 9 of the ICCPR. The judges concluded that the term ―everyone‖
encompassed a broader class of persons than citizens and permanent residents, and so
included refugee claimants. They further noted that returning them to a country where
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they face a threat to their life would be a violation of section 7 of the Charter 357. The
Court went on to observe that the procedure for refugee status determination did not
allow the claimants to effectively challenge a rejection of their claim, and as such it was
contrary to principles of fundamental justice358 and could not be justified under section 1
of the Charter359. They thus reached the conclusion that this breach could be avoided by
allowing the claimants a chance to demonstrate their refugee status through an oral
hearing.
Bassan argues that the Singh case allows the definition of ―security of the person‖ as
freedom from state-imposed psychological stress360.
The significance of this decision is that ―security of the person‖ can be engaged by
state-imposed psychological stress felt by aliens who, in this case, feared punishment
abroad. The limitation of the case is that it was based on the procedural content of the
principles of fundamental justice; it is clear that the aliens had no substantive right
per se to seek asylum in Canada.361
The claimants only challenged the procedural rules contained in the Immigration Act, and
did not ask for the recognition of a right of non-refoulement. The case does not actually
deal with the notion of state-imposed psychological stress, but it arguably could have
gone further than the procedural content to examine what happens to claimants who face
a risk to their life and do not fit the Convention refugee definition. Hence, in this
decision, the Supreme Court judges attempted to ensure the fulfilment of the right to life
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by demanding a fair hearing process, without turning the Charter into an alternative
protection mechanism.
Hathaway and Neve point out that the right to a hearing of every claim on its merits
remains conditional upon territorial access. The success of the screening process at the
border results in legal presence on the territory of the state of refuge362. A foreign
national, at a port of entry, may only be deemed admissible by immigration officers if
they find no ―reasonable grounds to believe‖ that the individual falls under sections 34 to
42 of IRPA. These provisions identify grounds for inadmissibility that include national
security, violating international human rights, serious criminality, organized criminality,
health grounds, financial reasons, misinterpretation, non-compliance with the act or an
inadmissible family member. Only when a claimant is admissible can he or she remain in
the country in order to present a protection claim.
According to sections 44 and 45 IPRA, if an officer finds an individual inadmissible, they
prepare a report, after which an admissibility hearing takes place. This hearing can result
in the admittance of the individual for further examination under subsection 45(c) of
IRPA, which can apply to asylum seekers.
However, there is no guarantee that an admissibility hearing based on 34 to 37 of IRPA,
which provide for inadmissibility based on grounds of different forms of criminality, will
include consideration of the possible risk faced by the foreign national who seeks entry.
The absolute nature of non-refoulement requires a careful weighing of the evidence that
the claimant faces a substantial risk of torture, a process which can only be achieved

362

James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, ―Fundamental Justice and the Deflection of Refugees from
Canada‖ (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 213 at 228.

109

fairly through a hearing of the claim on its merits. The determination of inadmissibility
may only be reversed by an appeal to the Minister, whose decision is discretionary.
Despite this possibility, the fact remains that sections 34 to 37 IRPA only require taking
into consideration the criminal background of the individual, without consideration for
the risk faced by said individual. The wording of these sections allows the literal
application of the distinction, within articles 12 and 13 of the ICCPR, between aliens who
are lawfully in the state territory and those who are not. The HRC‘s interpretation of this
article requires that exceptions be made when the alien faces a risk to her life.
Hathaway and Neve also argue that these inadmissibility provisions can preclude refugee
claimants from access to a full determination hearing on its merits. They demonstrate,
using the Berrahma363 and Nguyen364 cases, that Courts have not found this to be contrary
to the principles of the Charter. This position has been confirmed in several subsequent
cases365. In a more recent analysis based on these accessibility provisions and policy
statements by the government, Bossin has concluded that the IRPA was drafted with a
view to limit access to refugee status determination366. The IRPA thus fails to consider
the jus cogens nature of non-refoulement, and effectively violates article 31 of the
Refugee Convention, which aims to prevent penalties for claimants who enter the country
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of refuge without authorization. The Court‘s interpretation of IRPA seems to base the
right to make a claim on the legal entry into the territory of the state of refuge.
Such a result is also in apparent contradiction with section 2 IRPA, which states that one
of the first objectives of the Act is to save lives and offer of protection to the displaced
and persecuted367. The same section, in subsection (e), establishes the importance of fair
and efficient procedures that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Security
concerns are only mentioned at the bottom of the list368. The manner in which sections 34
to 37 IRPA may be applied, in light of the jurisprudence, does not take into consideration
the human rights that the law itself states as being the most important within the refugee
protection regime.
The Courts may generally be deemed to be aware of the importance of using human
rights, including far-reaching instruments such as the ICCPR, to guide the interpretation
of the protection mechanisms offered by the Canadian legislation. Nevertheless, the
courts‘ interpretations in many cases allow for loopholes that the ICCPR does not permit
and that are inconsistent with the legislation itself.
Civil and political rights, even those as fundamental as the right to life and the right to not
to be subjected to torture, are not entirely respected in Canada‘s domestic approach to
international protection. This thesis will now delve into the even more difficult
application of social, economic and cultural rights within the realm of international
protection.
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Chapter 5.
Rights

Protection Obligations Based on Social, Economic and Cultural

Now that I have dissected the prohibition of torture and other civil and political rights as
sources for complementary forms of asylum, it is worth expanding the scope of this thesis
to an analysis of social, economic and cultural rights as bases for asylum. I continue with
the same method, beginning with a discussion of a socio-economic basis for asylum
founded in international law, and then exploring how it applies in Canadian domestic
law.
First, I discuss international obligations related to socio-economic rights in a general
theoretical sense, and then apply them to more specific situations. Those will be natural
disasters, as they are situations where socio-economic rights may be difficult to fulfil, and
the inability to provide adequate health care, as it is of particular concern in Canadian
asylum law. I conclude the first section by examining whether longer-term concerns, such
as the preservation of minority cultures and the ability to earn a living through better
education, may serve as bases for complementary protection.
The second section of this chapter analyzes the Canadian asylum law regime in light of
the same socio-economic and cultural rights. I focus my analysis mainly on section 97
IRPA, as well as instances of Canada accommodating refugees fleeing from natural
disasters and other socio-economic problems. I also weave case law into my evaluation of
Canada‘s compliance with its socio-economic and cultural international obligations.
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5.1.Failure to Protect Socioeconomic Rights as a Basis for Asylum Claims
5.1.1. General Considerations Regarding Socio-Economic Rights in Relation
to Asylum
The UDHR contains some reference to socio-economic and cultural rights369, but they are
more detailed in the binding 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which entered into force in 1976, almost simultaneously with
the ICCPR. In Hathaway‘s opinion, the nature of the socio-economic rights recognized
in the ICESCR prove the strength and absolute nature of the rights protected in the
Refugee Convention as well as refugee-specific rights370. This is mainly due, he argues,
to the fact that despite the non-discriminate nature of the ICESCR rights, they are only
required to be granted in proportion to the member state‘s resources371. With some
refugees being indeed present in countries with fewer economic resources, they could be
denied many fundamental rights were it not for the existence of the Refugee Convention,
which guarantees those rights regardless of a country‘s economic resources372.
This may be a hint that the ICESCR, much like the ICCPR, may not serve as an
independent complementary protection mechanism, but it also suggests that a violation or
lack of fulfilment of social, economic and cultural rights may be a basis for protection.
Such a lack of fulfilment may result from a political choice, in which case it is worth
369
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asking if it amounts to persecution by the government. In other, more frequent cases, it
may result from a state‘s inability to provide for these rights. Such a situation can
arguably amount to persecution, just as the inability to protect from violations of basic
civil rights is a fundamental element of refugee status determination. A third issue to
consider with regards to socio-economic and cultural rights, is the extent to which they
are fulfilled by the state of refuge. Where civil and political rights are more strongly tied
to a right of non-return, socio-economic rights are often tied to settlement and the status
granted to protection seekers373. Indeed, there seems to be higher recognition for the right
to work, access to education and health care, and other rights for protected persons when
they settle in a country of refuge, than awareness of a need to protect individuals from
violations of those rights in their country of origin.
Before exploring how social and economic rights may expand the protection afforded by
the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is worth looking into the rights already contained in the
latter as a basis for comparison. The Convention provides refugees with access to wageearning employment374, self-employment375 and liberal professions376 equal as that
afforded to other aliens, as well as the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in terms
of protection of intellectual property377, access to national rationing systems378,
housing379, public education380, public relief and assistance381 and social security382.
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Clark suggests that the reiteration of the human rights that are contained in the Refugee
Convention within the binding covenants, such as the ICESCR, guarantees them to
protection seekers who are outside of the refugee definition, but find themselves in a
similar situation as refugees383. This contention may arguably be derived from article 5 of
the Refugee Convention, which states that nothing in said Convention can impair rights
and benefits accorded to refugees apart from the Convention384. Another author makes
the point that denying refugees and asylum seekers those social and economic rights upon
arrival could result in ―constructive refoulement‖385. Edwards writes:
Not only might the lack of social and economic rights in a particular destination
country threaten to deter individuals from seeking asylum from persecution there, but
it may act as a push factor in which refugees and/or asylum-seekers, out of pure
economic necessity, are forced to return to a country in which their life or freedom
could be threatened.386
This serves as a strong argument for the presence of an obligation to provide for the
social and economic rights contained in the Refugee Convention, to the same extent that
the Convention requires, to claimants whose status has not yet been recognized. Without
those rights, they might not be able to stay until their claim is heard and decided upon.
Despite the clarity of an obligation on the part of the state of refuge to guarantee rights to
individuals fleeing a risk to their life or persecution, it is unclear whether the unfulfilment
of a socio-economic or cultural right may prompt a legitimate asylum claim under
international law. At first glance, it appears that a situation would amount to persecution
383
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if the individual were being deprived of socio-economic rights due to one of the nexus
defined in the Refugee Convention, or faces a risk to life when the deprivation of one of
those rights constitutes cruel treatment or punishment.
An example of this is the right to adequate food and water that is explicitly recognized in
the ICESCR387. It is arguable that events such as the great famine of 1932-1933 in
Ukraine would have created conditions amounting to persecution, or at least conditions
that would render refoulement to Ukraine illegal. Some groups of Ukrainians, as well as
scholars, argue that the famine was a direct result of Stalin‘s economic policy and
intentionally designed to eliminate ethnic Ukrainians388. There is some debate and
uncertainty as to whether it fits the definition of genocide, but it is fairly clear that this
deprivation of a basic socio-economic right was intentional and brought on by state
policy389. A similar situation today, where intention is discerned behind a famine, would
make a convincing case for a refugee claim based on the denial of an economic right.
However, its strength would lie in the fact that it is connected to discrimination on the
basis of ethnicity, or, at the least, to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, which
would make it persecution in the sense of the Refugee Convention definition or a basis
for non-refoulement as provided for by the CAT and the ICCPR.
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It appears, then, that one of the main contributions of the ICESCR to international asylum
law is to widen the rights of persons who seek refuge in another state, but do not have a
recognized status. It does so mainly through its non-discrimination provision390, which
extends protection to social, economic and cultural rights to everyone regardless of status,
without jurisdiction limitations such as those contained in the ICCPR391. The Human
Rights Committee‘s comments on this provision clearly confirm this:
The ground of nationality should not bar access to Covenant rights, e.g. all children
within a State, including those with an undocumented status, have a right to receive
education and access to adequate food and affordable health care. The Covenant
rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers,
stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international trafficking, regardless
of legal status and documentation.392
Further, ICESCR rights serve as interpretative tools for the concept of persecution, in the
sense that if their denial by the state of origin is associated with one of the enumerated
grounds in Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention and poses a danger to an
individual‘s life, it can amount to persecution within the realm of said definition. If
deprivation of one of the ICESCR rights is severe enough to amount to torture or cruel
treatment or punishment, it allows for the principle of non-refoulement to apply.
According to UNHCR guidelines, the concept of persecution is fluid and much dependent
on the individual context of the claim393. On persecution through discrimination, the
UNHCR holds the view that individuals who benefit from less favourable treatment may
390
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be considered to suffer from persecution. However, it remains mindful of the distinction
between discrimination and persecution:
It is only in certain circumstances that discrimination will amount to persecution. This
would be so if measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially
prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to
earn his livelihood, his right to practise his religion, or his access to normally
available educational facilities.394
This interpretation of discrimination as persecution opens the way to consider the
deprivation of some socio-economic rights as part of a claim under the Refugee
Convention. However, the ICESCR does not appear to offer an independent protection
mechanism. It is, nonetheless, worth examining some specific situations where a socioeconomic protection need may arise and found a recognized protection claim.
5.1.2. Lack of Protection from Natural Disasters as Persecution
Once a rather marginal category of displaced persons, individuals fleeing from natural
disasters are now of growing concern to the international community. In addition to
accentuating the potential lack of protection from political persecution, natural disasters
cause a breakdown in many states‘ ability to provide for most basic socio-economic
rights. We know that a state‘s material inability to protect its nationals‘ and residents‘
civil and political rights may be sufficient to result in a right to be protected elsewhere.
The question thus arises as to whether the concept of protection may be extended to
situations of natural disasters, when states become unable to provide for their nationals‘
and residents‘ social and economic rights.
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The primary responsibility to adequately prepare in advance for natural disasters, as well
as to provide protection and assistance in the event of their occurrence, lies with the state
that is exposed to such a disaster395. Residents and nationals have the right to request such
protection and assistance, but if they intend to credibly claim protection from the
international community, they have the duty to claim their country‘s protection first. Only
if that request fails can displaced persons assert their state‘s inability to protect. This is
confirmed by the UN Human Rights Council:
Where the capacity and/or willingness of the authorities to fulfil their responsibilities
is/are sufficient, the international community needs to support and supplement the
efforts of the government and local authorities. The scope and complexity of many
natural disasters call for the active involvement of organizations and groups, both
within and outside the United Nations system, which possess special expertise and
resources, including from among the displaced and host communities, as well as from
civil society.396
This obligation is echoed by a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, in which
it defined the duty to protect as the obligation to take positive measures to protect from
imminent disasters, as well as providing redress in cases where loss results from the
negligence of local authorities397. Given the realization that states may be unable to
provide for their citizens following a natural disaster, UN guidelines generally favour
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humanitarian assistance on site, with no specific acknowledgement of natural disasters as
a basis for an international protection claim398.
The UNHCR has also considered how the depletion of natural resources due to climate
change may result in armed conflicts and violence399. According to the UNHCR, such
cases may warrant the application of the Refugee Convention as well as complementary
international protection400. Another scenario induced by climate change is that of sinking
islands due to rising sea levels, which will render many persons stateless401.
Theoretically, the refugee regime was designed to protect persons who are stateless, as
well as those who are de facto stateless due to lack of protection form their state. Hence,
people from such sinking states clearly would require some form of protection under
international law. This protection has been called for by the UNHCR, but no clear
international protection scheme has been designed as of yet.
The most obvious scenario and the main concern in this subsection is that of a sudden and
highly destructive natural disaster, like the Haiti earthquake in January 2010, or the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami. The UNHCR recognizes that individuals fleeing from such natural
disasters lack one of the criteria defined in the Refugee Convention, which is persecution
related to one of the five enumerated grounds in Article 1(A)(2)402. In order to fill this
legal vacuum, the UNHCR has mandated itself with a Cluster Approach. This involves
the joint participation of NGOs in a relief effort on a case-by-case basis, and, as
mentioned in chapter 2, has been helpful in assisting large numbers of displaced
398
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persons403. However, natural disasters would probably be easier to face if states
acknowledged an obligation to grant refuge or designed a framework that allows for a
more predictable and rapid response.
Currently, the only international legal instrument that provides protection to individuals
crossing borders because of a breakdown of socio-economic rights following a natural
disaster is the OAU Convention404. In article I(2), this convention defines a refugee as a
person ―compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin or nationality because of events seriously
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality‖.
This definition would include armed conflicts caused by the effects of climate change on
the availability of resources405. Also, the meaning of ―events seriously disturbing public
order‖ may be reasonably interpreted as including natural disasters, as there is no further
requirement that the ―events‖ should be directly caused by human activity406.
The UNHCR thus shows strong recognition of the need to extend protection to victims of
natural disasters and to develop a better means of protection of ICESCR rights in the
refugee context, but Canada has no obligation to provide such protection at the moment.
Although an ideal solution for victims of natural disasters would be to add only a
403
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provision that covers natural disasters within the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UNHCR
acknowledges that it is unrealistic, as it would open up a debate about the entire
international refugee protection system and, in light of the current political context, might
result in a restriction of the refugee definition407. At best, the OAU Convention serves as
an example that states outside of Africa may follow through their own legislation.
5.1.3. Lack of Adequate Health Care as Persecution
The right to the highest attainable standard of health408 is a complex right, which is
essential to the enjoyment of several other human rights, both civil and political, as well
as social and economic. It indeed affects fundamental civil rights such as the right to
life409, the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment410, the
freedom of movement411, and stems from important socio-economic rights such as the
right to food, water, clothing and adequate housing412, the right to social insurance and
social security413, and even the right to education414. Consistent with this intertwinement,
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the definition of health in article 12 ICESCR goes beyond health care by imposing
preventive and general public health measures, such as environmental and industrial
hygiene. Given its range, it is no surprise that the right to health comes into play in
different aspects of international refugee law.
No state can realistically be expected to guarantee a right to be healthy, but the right to
health comprises specific freedoms and entitlements415. According to the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‘ interpretation, Article 12 ICESCR provides the
entitlement to a health care system, which everyone may equally access, while
guaranteeing the individual freedom to control one‘s body, which includes sexual and
reproductive freedom416. In conjunction with the absolute non-discrimination provision in
article 2(2), this means that everyone, including refugees and other protection seekers,
should benefit from those rights. This interpretation has been partially confirmed in a
UNHCR study of complementary protection417.
[Individuals] who have been granted protection from removal are entitled to basic
human rights […]. Children of such persons are guaranteed access to free primary
education. In addition, all beneficiaries of protection from removal have the right to
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as an adequate
standard of living (i.e. shelter, food and clothing).418
This interpretation is limited to individuals who are granted protection from removal,
which links the rights to a status. These rights should actually be guaranteed to persons
whose removal or status determination is pending as well, in order to avoid ―constructive
415
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refoulement‖, that is, the idea that protection seekers might be forced to return to a
country where they risk persecution because of inadequate conditions upon arrival to the
country of refuge. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this thesis, it means that Canada has
the obligation to guarantee an appropriate standard of health to all individuals to whom it
grants refuge, regardless of the status attached to protection.
Meanwhile the concept of ―highest attainable standard of health‖ may be translated as
―the highest attainable standard of health possible given the state‘s resources and
biological predispositions and personal choices of the individual‖419. The fulfilment of
the right to health may thus be perceived as a balancing act. The general unavailability of
appropriate health care facilities would thus not be recognized in international law as a
ground for protection of individuals from states where such availability is
disproportionately lower than the states‘ resources. Nor is there such protection when the
quality, restrictions based on ethical or moral considerations or physical accessibility of
health care is inadequate in light of the available resources.
It appears, at this point in time, that international protection for individuals who do not
benefit from adequate health care only applies when their situation fits into the Refugee
Convention definition. The only aspect of the right to health that is consistent with those
requirements is that health services be offered in a non-discriminatory way. For instance,
individuals who are infected with HIV and are denied treatment, because of the prejudice
associated with the condition and, despite the state having sufficient resources to provide
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it, may qualify as refugees who are persecuted by reason of belonging to a social
group420. This is true if we apply the UNHCR‘s definition of social group.
A particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic
other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society.
The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is
otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one‘s human
rights.421
My analysis of Canadian case law in subsection 5.2.3 will determine how Canadian
authorities perceive persecution based on denial of health care.
5.1.4. Incidence of Cultural Rights in Asylum Claims
A final example of a pivotal right guaranteed by the ICESCR is the right of communities
to realize their cultural development, mainly through education. The right to education is
defined in article 13 ICESCR422, which is linked to the right to freely pursue economic,
social and cultural development in article 1(1) ICESCR423. These rights essentially open
up awareness to and respect of most civil and political rights, as well as the right to
benefit from social, economic and cultural development. As such, withholding people‘s
right to education may be perceived as persecution, and becomes yet another interesting
question regarding asylum law.
420
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The obligation to provide education to everyone, including persons benefiting from
asylum, becomes clear given my previous analysis of other socio-economic rights.
However, it is not entirely clear whether the withdrawal of this right for a targeted group
amounts to persecution. Following the interpretation of persecution through
discrimination offered by the UNHCR424, depriving a group of people of the right to
education might amount to persecution.
The Roma of Eastern and Central Europe could be cited as an example of such
persecution, as their access to education is limited in comparison with the majority ethnic
groups in countries such as Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria425. Despite the interpretation
that this amounts to persecution under the Refugee Convention, most European countries
reportedly have routinely refused refugee claims from Roma people based on both
discrimination and poor education, as well as violent attacks and vandalism426. Scholars
who study this issue seem to imply that many countries in which Roma make asylum
claims misunderstand their situation and discriminate against them through the rejection
of their claims427, which seems plausible to me. It is also worth noting that the Roma can
present an example of persecution based on other socio-economic rights, as they ―have
much lower life expectancies, lower literacy rates, and a lower standard of living than the
general populace and often are relegated to appalling living conditions‖428. Much of these
conditions are arguably caused by rampant discrimination and inadequacy of state
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policies towards the Roma, and they have the effect of thwarting Romani communities‘
growth and threatening the preservation of their culture.
The foregoing observations on different socio-economic rights serve as an indication that
protection obligations, as outlined in the Refugee Convention, provide clear rights for
recognized refugees and protected persons upon settlement. Violations or deprivations of
socio-economic rights may also be considered under the refugee definition. However,
there is currently no customary or treaty law providing clear protection to individuals
who seek protection from denial of education and cultural development, but ethnic
minority struggles serve as an indication that such obligations should be clarified, and
means of protection extended.
5.2.Implementation of Socio-Economic Rights in Canadian Asylum Law
5.2.1. The Obligation to Provide for Claimants’ Socio-Economic Rights
Canadian immigration and refugee protection legislation and regulations provide several
references to social and economic rights. They generally conform to Canada‘s clearer
Refugee Convention obligations, but present an interpretative challenge where
international obligations are not quite set in stone. From the previous section, I have
identified the obligation of countries of refuge to provide adequate health care, the right
to work, and the right to benefit from social security and education for children that are
equal to the rights afforded to their nationals. This is clear in the Refugee Convention,
and strengthened by the wide scope of the ICESCR.
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As a response to this right, refugee claimants and other protection claimants are granted a
permanent resident visa429, which allows them to apply for employment authorization, to
receive social security, or to apply for student authorization. This in turn allows such
persons to have access to housing, clothing, food and water. Canada generally fulfils
these obligations regarding individuals recognized as refugees, and towards claimants
who are awaiting status determination.
As for considerations related to health care, foreign nationals are deemed inadmissible if
they are afflicted with a health condition that is likely to be a danger to public health, to
public safety, or might cause excessive demand430 on health or social services, based on
section 38 IRPA431. Currently, the regulations provide an exception to the excessive
demand exclusion for refugees and protection seekers, which means they all have access
to health care while their claim is pending and they will not be excluded on these
grounds432. However, the exception does not cover protection seekers who might cause a
risk to public safety or public health, for instance those who present with a highly
contagious disease that may cause a risk of epidemic433. It seems that just as the
obligation to provide protection cannot be avoided by restricting territorial access, the
429
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obligation to provide health care to protection seekers should be extended to prevent such
restrictions on territorial access. States of refuge such as Canada have the appropriate
health care facilities to provide services to individuals who fear for their life while
avoiding a national epidemic. Recognizing this would avoid turning protection claimants
away due to a medical condition.
5.2.2. Protection from Natural Disasters
The IRPA and its affiliated regulations make no direct mention of situations of natural
disasters, but they present two apparent windows of opportunity for persons seeking
refuge from such situations. The first one is to seek a decision of the Minister based on
humanitarian or compassionate grounds, in order to waive the usual requirements of the
IRPA434. The second is the possibility to interpret the provisions regarding humanitarianprotected persons abroad435 in a wide-ranging manner. These provisions were designed to
expand the meaning of ―person in similar circumstances‖ in subsection 12(3) IRPA436.
This subsection is part of the section relating to classes of foreign nationals who may be
selected as permanent residents. It thus includes refugees who make inland claims, and
also allows for assistance to persons outside of Canada who find themselves in a situation
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that does not satisfy all the requirements of the Refugee Convention definition, but are
nevertheless considered as deserving protection.
The regulations express what is meant by ―similar circumstances‖ in Canadian
legislation. Humanitarian-protected persons may be members of the country of asylum
class437, or members of the source country class438. None of these provisions include
humanitarian tragedies caused by natural disasters, as they are meant to extend protection
to individuals affected by civil war, or persons from countries where civil and political
rights are systematically violated439. Given the wording of this provision, it is more likely
to apply when civil and political unrest come about as a result of devastation by a natural
disaster.
The Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has, nonetheless, issued certain
guidelines regarding situations where natural disasters occur. There is no special program
designed to grant refuge to such persons, but applicants for all immigration or refugee
classes may have their claims processed in an expedited manner when they are rendered
more vulnerable by such an event440.
In a review of the case law regarding international protection, the Immigration and
Refugee Board confirms that no interpretation of international refugee law allows for the
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inclusion of victims of natural disasters or climate change441. They reach this conclusion
by stating that inability to protect alone would not be sufficient to allow for a claim to be
accepted, as persecution is also required. They base this on the Ward case442:
The need for ―persecution‖ in order to warrant international protection, for example,
results in the exclusion of such pleas as those of economic migrants, i.e., individuals
in search of better living conditions, and those of victims of natural disasters, even
when the home state is unable to provide assistance, although both of these cases
might seem deserving of international sanctuary.443
This analysis rightfully underlines the importance of the requirement that persecution
occurs. However, there is a difference between persons seeking a higher standard of
living, and those who face a serious and immediate risk to their life due to a natural
disaster. The Court could have been more flexible in their application of this requirement
in the latter case, given that migration is not entirely done by choice.
It appears then, that despite a compliance with clearly defined international obligations
derived from multilateral treaties, Canada is not willing to go beyond these obligations by
following norms and general recommendations of the UNHCR or other UN bodies.
5.2.3. Protection from Unwillingness or Inability to Provide Health Care
In addition to exceptions relating to health care in the determination of admissibility at
the frontier, section 97 IRPA, which recognizes persons in need of protection, contains an
explicit exclusion of claims relating to the inability to provide health care.
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A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country
or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their
country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally […] to a risk to
their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if […] the risk is
not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical
care.444
I have previously demonstrated that such an exception would not be inconsistent with
Canada‘s international obligations. However, the language of this subsection, in a way,
supports my argument that an obligation to protect persons who need health services that
are disproportionately inaccessible could be legitimate under international law. In this
section of IRPA, the Canadian government recognizes an obligation to protect individuals
from a risk to life that can be avoided by granting refuge. In the same breath, this section
excludes a risk to life related to inadequate health care. Had it not specified that
exclusion, the case law could have included it by interpreting the general objective of this
provision.
This exception only identifies inability to provide adequate health care, which suggests
that a state‘s unwillingness to provide health care would be a basis for protection in
Canadian law. I have mentioned the hypothetical example of individuals who are HIV
positive in the previous section as situations where a state may be unwilling to provide
health care due to membership in a particular social group. Such cases have been recently
examined by the Federal Court in the A.B. case445.
Under the refugee claim analysis, the IRB had deemed the claimants, HIV positive
persons from Zimbabwe, part of a social group. However, the IRB found that their
444
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132

allegations of stigmatization and thus persecution were too speculative446. The IRB‘s
conclusions on the country conditions acknowledge the instability of Zimbabwe as a
factor in limiting the country‘s resources, but they observe that health care is available to
all, and that it should not be evaluated according to Canadian standards or judged on its
shortcomings447. The IRB also analyzed the case in light of whether the claimants were
persons in need of protection pursuant to section 97 IRPA. They concluded that the
claimants did not face a risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment, and that health care
in Zimbabwe is equally accessible to all448. The Board only considered section 25 IRPA,
and whether to grant status on compassionate and humanitarian grounds, as an alternative
protection mechanism449.
The Federal Court reviewed the Board‘s analysis of section 97 IRPA. In their opinion,
―the correct approach to the application of section 97 of the IRPA in a context like this
one is to first decide if there is sufficient evidence to establish that an applicant‘s life
would be at risk and then to determine if the health care exclusion applies‖450. Relying on
an analysis of the Covarrubias451 and Singh452 cases, and an analysis of the evidence
presented by the claimants, the Court concluded that they did not qualify for protection
under 97 IRPA, due to inadequate evidence. Nevertheless, their interpretation of section
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97 IRPA allows protection for individuals who are denied health care in a discriminatory
fashion. This conclusion is based on the words within the legislation. The Court states:
I am not satisfied that the section 97(1)(b)(iv) exclusion is so wide that it would
preclude from consideration all situations involving a person‘s inability to access
health care in his country of origin. […] Parliament has frequently used the phrase
―unable or unwilling‖ in the IRPA (see sections 96, 97, and 39). [The] failure to use
―unwilling‖ in section 97(1)(b)(iv) was quite deliberate and was intended to narrow
the scope of that exclusion. [It] would take very little adjustment to the language of
the exclusion to make it beyond doubt that it was intended to cover every situation of
risk to life on health grounds.453
They further strengthen this interpretation by fitting it into an analysis of international
human rights and the purpose of international protection.
[The] Federal Court of Appeal decision in De Guzman v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) […]454 clearly endorses an approach to the
interpretation of the language of the IRPA to achieve, where possible, harmony with
Canada‘s obligations under international human rights instruments. As an example,
[…] the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights […]
requires states‘ parties to use their maximum of available resources for the realization
of the right to health. […] Canada should extend refugee protection to claimants who
would otherwise be returned to places where their governments are in deliberate noncompliance with such international commitments and where their lives would be in
jeopardy. 455
It seems then, that if a claimant who requests protection through section 97 IRPA
manages to establish, with corroborating evidence, that they are being denied health care
as a means of discrimination, they may thus obtain refuge in Canada.
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5.2.4. Protection from Unwillingness or Inability to Provide Education
Where discrimination in education is considered, Canadian law reflects the general
evasiveness of international human rights law on the subject, and the lack of recognition
in international protection for longer term concerns such as the preservation of a minority
culture, and equal prospects of earning a livelihood.
Discrimination through education is still commonly mentioned in cases where other types
of persecution and discrimination are considered, including in protection claims made by
Roma of Eastern and Central Europe, who exemplify this concern. Many of the Roma
cases involve claimants who have been unnecessarily and arbitrarily placed in schools for
children with special needs, or fear that their children will not have access to the same
level of education as the majority of children in the same countries because of rampant
discrimination from educators456. Although the differential treatment is based on the
claimants‘ ethnicity, education concerns alone are not sufficient to found a protection
claim. The claims were only accepted when they also included other factors such as
physical abuse457.
One instance where the right to education was more seriously considered by the Federal
Court was a case where a Romani couple had a Canadian-born child who would be
seriously disadvantaged if the family were returned to Romania458. The Court recognized
the following problems faced by Romani children, including several ways in which they
are disadvantaged in education:
456
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Roma children often experience discrimination and exclusion when accessing state
education. Some reports detail overt discrimination, such as teachers only providing
help to non-Roma children, through to reports of violence and abuse directed at Roma
children. Several sources noted that lack of education was a serious problem among
Roma in Romania. Roma children are 25 per cent less likely to attend elementary
school and 30 per cent likely [sic] to attend secondary school. Children are among
those who are directly affected by human rights abuses in Romania. […] The lack of
economic and social opportunities in Romanian society has subjected Roma children
to various vulnerabilities. In some circumstances, they are forced to work to earn a
living. While the law prohibits forced or compulsory child labor, such practices
remain widespread in Romani communities. Many children were reported to
occasionally forego attending school while working on family farms, especially in
rural areas and in Romani communities. 3.9 million of the 5.6 million children in the
country were "economically active". Over 300 thousand (approximately 7 percent)
were "child laborers‖[…] Child labor, including begging, selling trinkets on the
street, or washing windshields, remained widespread in Romani communities;
children engaged in such activities could be as young as five years old.459
In that case, the Court deemed the best interests of the child in relation to education, as
well as the social and economic setting that leads to lack of education, as the determining
factors of the case, and that the previously cited conditions were not properly taken into
consideration. The court thus considered the Visa Officer‘s decision to be manifestly
unreasonable and referred it to redetermination by another Visa Officer. However, it
remains a rare occurrence and most cases need more elements of persecution for
protection to be granted.
From this, it appears that the social, economic and cultural rights contained in the
ICESCR do not create a basis for protection in themselves, but they may guide the
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interpretation of the Refugee Convention and alternative protection mechanisms that exist
in states. As such, protection claims where it is alleged that these rights are unfulfilled
may be granted, when the unfulfilment of ICESR rights corresponds with criteria in
existing protection schemes. However, claims based on rights that are significant in the
long term tend to be associated with the search for a higher standard of living and are,
thus, usually rejected.
From these chapters dealing with how human rights can be invoked to expand protection,
the following chapter looks into how considerations regarding the claimant‘s identity
affect the application of protection mechanisms.
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Chapter 6. Obligations Related to Groups not Explicitly Accounted for by the
Refugee Definition
My discussion has so far centred around the types of protection that are generally
applicable to everyone, regardless of other considerations such as age, gender or family
ties. This chapter deals with how these three considerations affect the interpretation of
international law and human rights, and how they may widen the scope of international
protection for specific groups of people. It is also concerned with specific rules that have
a positive discrimination effect and account for the needs of groups who may be more
vulnerable, such as children and women. I also deal with the specific value of the
preservation of family ties, which affects the interpretation and application of
international protection laws.
This chapter is divided according to the different concerns or groups I have identified,
starting with the importance of the preservation of family ties, the best interests of the
child, and finally, touching upon the awareness of types of persecution that are more
detrimental to women and the protection that is granted accordingly. Each section
contains an overview of the protection offered by international law, followed by an
analysis of Canadian law and policy regarding the same topic.
6.1.Concern with Family Ties and Family Unity
Respect for family life is an important factor in the interpretation of alien rights in the
ICCPR. Along with the prohibition of torture and cruel, unusual or inhuman treatment or
punishment and non-discrimination, it is one of the factors which trigger an exception to
the state‘s ability to determine who enters its territory460. In light of the foregoing, it
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becomes relevant to look into the way family ties may be used to extend protection to
persons who would otherwise be excluded.
The ICCPR generally recognizes family as ―the natural and fundamental group unit of
society‖ that is ―entitled to protection by the society and State‖461. Article 23 of ICCPR
further recognizes the right to wilfully marry and found a family462. The concept of
family is to be broadly interpreted as it is understood in the country concerned463. In
addition to the obligation to protect family integrity through legislation, states have the
obligation not to interfere with it464.
This recognition of the importance of the family unit suggests that persons who are
granted protection by an asylum state should see the same protection afforded to their
family in order to preserve its integrity. It also creates awareness that persecution may
have repercussions on an entire family, and not just on the individual who faces it
directly. This is reflected by the Human Rights Committee‘s comments on the protection
of the family:

Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party. It is in
principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory. However, in certain
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for
example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for
family life arise.‖
461
Article 23(1) ICCPR.
462
Article 23(2), (3) and (4): ―The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a
family shall be recognized.
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and
responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution,
provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.‖
463
Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The
Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and
Reputation, HRC, 32d Sess. (1988), online: UNHCR Refworld <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4538
83f922.html>.
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[The] possibility to live together implies the adoption of appropriate measures, both at
the internal level and as the case may be, in cooperation with other States, to ensure
the unity or reunification of families, particularly when their members are separated
for political, economic or similar reasons.465
Apart from the Refugee Convention provision that nothing in the latter can impair other
rights granted to refugees466, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries that adopted the
Convention itself issued a recommendation affirming refugees‘ right to family unity467.
However, the right to family unity is not as widely recognized as the right not to be
subjected to torture, and States tend to shape its scope according to the best interests of
the child, the state‘s right to make decisions on entry or stay of non-nationals and the
nature of the family ties involved468. The factor that strengthens it most remains the
imperative obligation to act in the best interest of the child469, which will be discussed at
greater length in the following section.
Based on the foregoing international affirmations of the importance of family unity, it is
conceivable that persecution under the Refugee Convention can comprise of interference
465
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with family life by reason of one of the five enumerated grounds, and that if the state fails
or refuses to fulfil this right, it ought to be a basis for a refugee claim under section 96 of
IRPA. Conversely, where a risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment is concerned, it may be demonstrated as a risk to the entire family and should
warrant the protection of section 97 of IRPA. It may also be demonstrated through threats
targeting the family or the persons who provide for the rest of the family. My analysis of
Canadian case law and policy will reveal that such an interpretation has not been applied.
Furthermore, families may require protection based on the risk faced by one of their
members. However, family unity does not overcome the possibility of exclusions based
on serious criminality under article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention, or section 98 of
IRPA in the Canadian context. If one member faces exclusion, family members may
demonstrate that they, nonetheless, deserve refugee or protected person status, and they
may demonstrate that they face a greater risk due to the excludable act of their family
member470. In reality, members of an excluded claimant‘s family need to make a difficult
choice between facing a risk of persecution and breaking family unity. In light of this,
Feller and others call for a very strict interpretation of the exclusion clauses in Canada, in
order to avoid breaking families apart for crimes that do not warrant exclusion471.
Furthermore, in cases of deportation such as Chiarelli472, the constitutional analysis of the
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validity of deportation orders does not take into account principles such as family unity,
something Bassan deplores in her analysis of the case. She writes:
The Chiarelli position sanctions the fundamental importance of the State‘s power to
expel while seemingly ignoring the alien‘s competing interests. In order to extend
constitutional protections to permanent residents facing deportation from Canada, it is
incumbent upon the courts to adequately consider the interests of the individual,
whose ties with the State are through home, family and society.473
In deportation cases, the best interests of the child, if their separation from a parent would
cause undue hardship, are likely to have a higher impact in the weighing of competing
rights than mere family unity. I will examine such cases in the following section.
In Canada, the right to family unity has been mentioned in the case law as part of the
concept of ―indirect persecution‖474. It was defined and applied in the Bhatti case in these
terms:
The theory is based on a recognition of the broader harm caused by persecutory acts.
By recognizing that family members of persecuted persons may themselves be
victims of persecution, the theory allows the granting of status to those who might
otherwise be unable to individually prove a well-founded fear of persecution.475
This decision included the psychological stress and trauma related to a family member
being persecuted, but also went as far as considering the adverse effects of persecution on
family members‘ social and economic rights through impeding the head of the family‘s
ability to earn a livelihood476.
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The Federal Court reined in this expansion in the interpretation of the Refugee
Convention definition in subsequent decisions. Rothstein J. considered, in the PourShariati case477, that the concept of indirect persecution had been too broadly defined in
the name of family unity.
The concept of ―indirect persecution‖ in Bhatti is defined in very broad terms. It can
encompass situations ranging from a person witnessing the ill-treatment of loved ones
to the experience of a person who is obliged to stay in his or her country of origin,
without the economic and social support of a certain family member. It is suggested
that the principle of family unity justifies the indirect persecution concept.478
Rothstein J. states that such a broad concept is irreconcilable with the Convention refugee
definition and unjustifiably broadens it479.
The idea of indirect persecution supported by the importance of family unity was later
excluded altogether from the refugee definition in Casetellantos480, which has been
confirmed in the more recent Sivamoorthy481 case. Similar to the Supreme Court‘s
analysis of distress caused by natural disasters482, the Casetellanos case made no
distinctions between psychological and physical trauma caused by the persecution of a
family member because of one of the five Convention grounds, and the way such
persecution affects the family‘s ability to earn a livelihood or maintain a certain standard
of living. Also, the IRB states that claims based solely on family unity, defined by the
UNHCR483 as cases where the immediate family members of a claimant who fits the
refugee definition may be granted protection regardless of their own risk of persecution
477
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on the sole basis of the principle of family unity, are not recognised in Canadian law484.
The IRB thus confirms the reversal in the case law, altogether rejecting indirect
persecution founded on family ties as a basis for the application of the Refugee
Convention definition.
Despite the protection provisions being interpreted in a limited way, a claimant who is
recognized as a protected person may apply for permanent residence along with their
family members, even if they are abroad. An individual who is recognized as a protected
person has 180 days to apply for permanent residence485, and they may include family
members in this application486. Family members may only obtain permanent residence
after the protected person has paid the processing fees487, obtained their own permanent
resident status and demonstrated that their family members are indeed related in the way
they claim to be488. The claim is then processed through the Canadian visa office abroad.
Hence, despite the limited interpretation of the Refugee Convention and of persons in
need of protection provisions being focused on the individual and not the family, an
individual who is granted protection may be reunited with his or her family. However,
this reunification process has been the subject of criticism due to processing delays, as it
takes several months to gather the processing fees, and then several more months to
process the applications489. Added to the time a claimant is separated from their family
while their protection claim is being processed, this can add up to at least 2 years of
separation and seriously challenge the integrity of family relationships.
484

IRB, Refugee Definition in the Case Law, supra note 441 at 9-30, 9-31.
Section 175 IRPA Regulations.
486
Section 176 IRPA Regulations.
487
The fees amount to $550 per adult and $150 per child.
488
Canadian Council for Refugees, More than a Nightmare: Delays in Refugee Family Reunification
(Montreal: Canadian Council for Refugees, 2004) at 6.
489
Ibid. at 7.
485

144

From the abovementioned observations, it appears that in Canadian law, family unity
itself is insufficient to extend the parameters of protection contained in the Refugee
Convention, an interpretation that is inconsistent with the UNHCR‘s inclusion of family
unity as a basis for extended protection. However, it is possible that family unity is given
weight when tied to another, more clearly and generally accepted factor, such as the best
interest of the child or women‘s rights. The former will be the subject of the next section.
6.2.The Importance of the Best Interests of the Child
From a legal point of view, children have a clearly defined status as minors490, which
triggers a higher responsibility and duties on the part of the family and the state. It is,
therefore, hardly surprising that provisions directly target them in both international and
domestic law. In the ICCPR, article 23 on the protection of family unity is directly
followed by an article guaranteeing the protection of the child without discrimination491.
The HRC states that all civil and political rights should be guaranteed to children, as well
as the rights they benefit from as minors492. The protection of children‘s rights benefits
from a near-universal ratification, with only two signatory countries not having ratified
the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child493. Signatory states are, nonetheless,
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bound to refrain from undermining its objectives, as stated by the Supreme Court in
Baker494.
In international law, and under the Canadian interpretation of it, protection related to
some civil and political rights is more easily triggered where minors are concerned495.
One of those rights is the inherent right to life and the prohibition of torture. Those rights
have been recognized in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which guarantees and
extends them by prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty or imprisonment without
possibility of liberation on children under 18496. The Canadian Immigration and Refugee
Board has declared that it recognizes an inherent difference when a certain type of
treatment is inflicted on a child or on an adult, based on the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the comments of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child497. The IRB
states: ―Although the same definition of torture applies to both adults and to children, its
application should take into account the particular situation of children, as recognized in
the Convention on the Rights of the Child‖498. The UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child‘s recommendations describe the extent of the protection required for children
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within the realm of discipline, detention and punishment which, if they surpass the
threshold outlined or fail to fulfil the obligations outlined by the Committee, become a
basis for protection against cruel, unusual or degrading treatment499.
The rights of the child with regards to cruel treatment have been considered by the
Federal Court in the Hashmat case500, which centred around whether a family could
relocate to another part of Afghanistan to avoid the risk of persecution. This possibility,
termed Internal Flight Alternative (IFA), forms part of the assessment of the inability or
unwillingness to protect on the part of the home country. If claimants may avoid
persecution by moving to a different region of their country of origin, they are denied
refugee status. In this case, however, the high risk of violence being inflicted on the
children on the journey to the possible IFA excluded it as a viable option. The same goes
for an IFA where there is no family or other settlement arrangements available for the
child501.
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The IRB has also directly applied the standards against violence inflicted on children. For
example, they did so in Decision VA0-02635502, concerning a Chinese adolescent who
had been beaten into submission by his father and forced to come to Canada to earn
money for his family.
[In] the panel's view, the cruel and degrading punishment which the claimant received
cannot be justified under rubrics like "filial piety" and "patrilineal authority." The
States parties to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child took a stand against
violence towards children, and by doing so clearly held that the international
community should not tolerate certain patterns of behaviour, whether or not they are
culturally-specific. Using children as soldiers, selling them into prostitution, and
beating them into submission are all acts enjoined by the Convention, wrong
wherever they are practiced, in China or in Canada. Thus, when "filial piety" and
"patrilineal authority" result in the psychological disabling of a child's normal
functioning, "cultural" values must take a back seat to the child's best interests. It is
persecution to be beaten in this cruel and systematic way, whatever arguments we
advance to justify it.503
The same view has been upheld in another case of parental abuse, allowing an individual
claim by a child to be accepted504. In both cases, the children were being illegally
trafficked, and would be inevitably ―re-trafficked‖ if returned. The IRB also concluded
that despite the existence of child protection laws in China, the cultural importance of the
father as the head of the family usually prevails and the laws are rarely enforced. The
lack of fulfilment of a child‘s basic economic and social rights, which are generally
provided to other children in the same country of origin, has also been accepted by courts
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as persecution. Indeed, ―A child who would experience hardships including deprivation
of medical care, education opportunities, employment opportunities and food would
suffer concerted and severe discrimination, amounting to persecution‖505.
More pivotal in the interpretation of protection measures in Canadian law is the principle
of the best interests of the child. Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
requires courts of law to treat it as a primary consideration, without distinction as to the
area of law concerned506. As such, it is an important part of asylum and refugee
protection, in terms of procedural matters and treatment of asylum seekers, as well as the
status determination on its merits507. It is also tied to the principle of family unity, which
is defined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child as part of a child‘s fundamental
rights.
This principle‘s general acceptance is hampered by its wide net of protection and the
issue of indeterminacy that accompanies it. Indeed, it might be very far reaching and
connected to a great variety of rights, but it also may be considered as vague 508. For
example, genital mutilation may be considered in many states as being in the best interest
of the child in some cultures because of its significance in the child‘s social development
and their membership in a community, whereas in other states, the violence of the

505

Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 2 F.C. 314 at 325, cited in IRB,
Refugee Definition in the Case Law, supra note 441 at 3-13.
506
Paragraphs 3(1) and 3(2) CRC: ―1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her wellbeing, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals
legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative
measures.‖
507
McAdam, supra note 5 at 173.
508
Ibid. at 179.

149

practice sets it against a child‘s best interests509. In Canadian cases, the practice has been
considered as amounting to persecution and thus against the best interests of the child510,
which suggests that Canada interprets violence as a more important factor than social
norms in the consideration of those interests.
The best interests of the child are given varying weight in status determination, or in the
evaluation of deportation orders in different countries511, but the courts in Canada
attribute a substantial weight to the principle512. Although family unity on its own does
not have a major impact on deportation cases, the Supreme Court‘s analysis in Baker513
has led to a different conclusion when the best interests of children come into play.
This case was concerned with a woman who applied for an exemption from her
deportation order based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, under section
114(2) of the Immigration Act514. One of the reasons she submitted for her exemption
was the negative effect her deportation might have on her children. L‘Heureux-Dubé J.
recognized that the Convention on the Rights of the Child was not implemented into
Canadian law, and thus did not have a direct application in domestic law, but, she argued,
its fundamental principles ought not to be undermined through the application and
interpretation of domestic law515. In that case, the principle at hand was the best interests
of the child, and this case consecrated its important weight in deportation decisions. The
509
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principle has since been integrated directly into section 25(1) of IRPA. This provision
deals with ministerial discretion based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, both
in cases of admission and deportation, and requires the Minister to consider the best
interest of the child when evaluating such requests516.
The reasoning in this landmark case is consistent with the guidelines of the IRB, which
require the analysis of the best interest of the child as a primary consideration in all
claims involving child refugee claimants517. Nonetheless, the endorsement of the
principle by the Supreme Court led to a consistent consideration of the best interests of
the child in asylum or deportation cases. One such case is Patel518, where the Federal
Court justifies the application of the best interests of the child to a protection claim.
The applicant submits that humanitarian and compassionate considerations have no
place in the determination of whether or not a claimant is a Convention refugee or a
person in need of protection. And that the Board is required to make a determination
on the basis of the factors set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act. Any humanitarian
and compassionate factors raised by a particular claimant, such as the best interest of
the child, can only be fully considered once a determination is made on the issue
whether a claimant merits protection in Canada. However, the words ―humanitarian
and compassionate‖ are not found in the Board‘s reasons, although references are
made on the other hand to ―the best interests of the child‖. But as the applicant has
acknowledged, the ―best interests of the child‖ are relevant to the procedures
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followed in such a case.519
This statement confirms that the IRB has a duty to consider all humanitarian and
compassionate grounds brought forth by a claimant, including the best interests of the
child, upon making a decision on admission.
In another case regarding the deportation of a Romani couple that has a Canadian-born
child, the Court recognizes the inclusion of access to proper education in the analysis of
the best interests of the child520. One of the main concerns of the parents in this case was
the discrimination faced by Romani children within the Romanian education system,
which results in the Romani community being limited in its ability to earn a livelihood.
The Court establishes in this case, as well as in Patel, that the general well-being and
necessities of life for the child have to be considered when evaluating the best interest of
the child, and those may include civil and political rights as well as socio-economic
rights. Hence, children‘s rights do not create new and separate mechanisms of protection.
They expand existing ones beyond their literal interpretation, in accordance with new
developments in human rights law. The next section focuses on whether women‘s rights
have the same effect on asylum practices.
6.3.Gender-Related Persecution and Concerns Specific to Women
It is generally recognized that women and girls are a more vulnerable group as
refugees521, and there is growing acceptance for the inclusion of women as a particular
social group within the Convention Refugee definition522, and for feminism as a political
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opinion523 for the purpose of the Refugee Convention definition. Edwards comments on
the developments regarding refugee women in these terms:
As a culmination of these developments, judicial reasoning took on new approaches,
moving away from paradigms dominated by the experiences of male refugees, and
towards a gender-sensitive and gender-inclusive interpretation and application of
refugee law that gave equal significance to the sometimes different, although no less
serious, forms of persecution feared by women. Case law has recognized a wide
range of valid claims, including sexual violence, domestic violence, punishment and
discrimination for transgression of social mores, sexual orientation, female genital
mutilation, and trafficking […].524
These comments reflect the focus of this section. It will combine gender-specific
concerns in international human rights law, the most recent guidelines issued by the
UNHCR, and how they impact on Canadian asylum legislation and case law.
The ICCPR recognizes the right of women to enjoy all civil and political rights without
discrimination525 and prevents the imposition of the death penalty on pregnant women526.
The ICESCR reiterates the prohibition of discrimination against women527 and further
protects them against discrimination in work conditions528. These provisions reflect an
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awareness of common patterns of discrimination against women and have been expanded
by the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW)529 and its enforcing Committee‘s position that gender-based
violence fits within the definition of discrimination against women530.
However, if we apply this in the asylum context, not all discrimination against women
amounts to persecution. It appears, rather, from Edwards‘ comments and examples of
persecution, that it becomes persecution when tied with some form of violent or cruel
behaviour that exploits the particular vulnerabilities of women. It may also become
persecution when it results directly from a discriminatory state policy531.
Also, Edwards contends, the CEDAW requires asylum states to implement gendersensitive asylum procedures by considering the foregoing types of gender-related
persecution, as well as the way gender may affect the possibility of reaching an IFA532.
She further calls attention to the various forms of discrimination, which prevent women
from reaching a state of asylum and essentially stem from the human rights situation of
the country of origin.
These can include restrictions on the freedom of movement of women in her country
of origin, lack of access to necessary documentation, such as passports, because she is
female, legal requirements for permission from husbands to travel or cultural factors
that put women travelling alone or without male family members at risk of
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harassment and violence.533
As such, they appear to fall out of the scope of the protection system in countries of
asylum such as Canada, which process mostly inland claims. However, part of my
enquiry on the role of UNHCR and independent organizations in international protection
has shown that Canada protects some individuals abroad through its humanitarianprotected persons abroad classes.
The UNHCR has issued and updated guidelines on the integration of gender in the
interpretation of the Refugee Convention534. The guidelines explore how gender, as a
social construct, may affect persecution based on one of the five grounds enumerated in
the Convention. For instance, it may intersect with religion, if a woman is persecuted for
not conforming with the behavioural codes assigned to women in her religion 535. They
also touch upon the interpretation of social group as including sex, which is, like other
social groups, innate and unchangeable536.
Those guidelines have been picked up by the IRB, which issued its own guidelines for
board members processing gender-based persecution claims. The IRB identifies four
broad categories of women refugee claimants where gender may be relevant for
understanding persecution. These are:
Women who fear persecution on the same Convention grounds, and in similar
circumstances, as men, [women] who fear persecution solely for reasons pertaining to
kinship, i.e. because of the status, activities or views of their spouses, parents, and
siblings, or other family members, [women] who fear persecution resulting from
533

Ibid. at 19.
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related
Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (2002).
535
Ibid. at 7.
536
Ibid. at 8.
534

155

certain circumstances of severe discrimination on grounds of gender or acts of
violence either by public authorities or at the hands of private citizens from whose
actions the state is unwilling or unable to adequately protect the concerned persons,
[and women] who fear persecution as the consequence of failing to conform to, or for
transgressing, certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and practices
in their country of origin.537
The IRB goes on to condone the inclusion of gender in the category of particular social
groups, based on the Ward538 case, as well as on the UNHCR‘s interpretations of
international law539. In such cases, the persecution has to occur because of the person‘s
gender, or because of a woman‘s belonging to a specific subgroup of women.
Dauvergne‘s research on the vulnerabilities of women in all aspects and stages of the
refugee determination process has shown that the IRB‘s gender guidelines have not been
consistently and effectively applied540. In many recent cases, both the Board fails to
appreciate the particular vulnerabilities of women and the trauma associated with sexual
violence.
For example, in the recent Gaymes case541, a woman from the small island state of StVincent and Grenadines was claiming persecution based on the fact that her father had
sexually abused her. Her claim was that the abuse led to the development of a mental
537
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illness, that she suffered continuous harassment by local people who knew of her
situation, and that she had been the victim of a sexual assault by two men and a
policeman who took advantage of weaknesses caused by her mental illness. Both the
Board and the reviewing Court deemed that she had not provided sufficient proof of the
assault, disregarding the fact that it may be unrealistic to ask for documented proof in a
case of rape, especially since the claimant was still not comfortable even mentioning it
upon entry in Canada. In this case, the stigma attached to rape, as well as the other
elements of persecution brought forth by the claimant, were not carefully weighed by the
Court.
In some cases, the IRB has recognized that women who face a personal risk of cruel
treatment in the form sexual violence and who cannot obtain police protection should be
granted protection542. There are, nonetheless, numerous instances where the Board does
not properly assess psychological evidence related to sexual assault and the reluctance to
report such incidents to the authorities in light of gender considerations
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those cases, the reviewing Court quashes the decisions based on insufficient
consideration of the gender guidelines. In practice, however, only a minority of decisions
are reviewed, which raises concerns as to the Boards consistency with the application of
the guidelines.
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Another critique is that men may also be persecuted based on gender if they refuse to
conform to the gender identity that is assigned to them. LaViolette argues that the
Canadian guidelines reflect persecution based on sex, rather than including all the forms
of persecution based on gender as a social construct 544. Even where women are
concerned, LaViolette highlights cases before the IRB where claims by lesbian women
were only considered in light of sexual orientation, without further analysis of the
persecution related to their challenge to established norms of feminity545. These
considerations reflect the need to carefully explore the ramifications of each individual
case, while promoting an expansion of the interpretation of the notion of persecution and
the social group nexus in light of different aspects of gender roles. The Federal Court has
stated that the guidelines do not create new grounds for finding a person to be a victim of
persecution546, but it is arguable that the concept of persecution itself is often being too
narrowly interpreted. The Canadian interpretation based on gender thus seems to include
women‘s rights in the application of sections 96 and 97 of IRPA, but not in a way that is
as clear and consistent as the consideration of the best interests of the child within
Canadian asylum practice.
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Chapter 7.

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to provide a precise and nuanced view of Canada‘s compliance
with complementary protection obligations imposed by international human rights law,
while exploring different forms that complementary protection can take. It has argued
that the granting of refugee status to a new category of persons who fear for their life
within section 97 IRPA is a step forward, but does not represent Canada‘s full
compliance with its international obligations. Through an analysis of state obligations
based on several international human rights instruments developed after the 1951
Refugee Convention, this thesis has shown that Canadian law usually honours the
humanitarian concerns in international refugee law, while making efforts and creating
loopholes in order to maintain its prerogative of exclusion based on national security.
A historical overview of asylum practices and the creation of the international refugee
protection regime has revealed a shift from state discretion to an aspiring universal and
binding protection regime. The study of the work leading to the conclusion of the
Refugee Convention has revealed that it is inextricably linked with human rights law,
and that it can be qualified as ―a specialist human rights treaty which acts as a lex
specialis for persons in need of international protection‖547. Its drafting history shows that
it was meant to provide a framework of protection that would operate on a case-by-case
basis, and would be flexible enough to encompass most situations that were not
foreseeable at the time. In McAdam‘s words:
Whereas pre-1951 concepts of protection, based on national category, were expanded
incrementally through their application to new national groups, the Convention
conceptualization has been extended through developments in human rights law,
547
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which have informed both the meaning of ‗persecution‘ and the scope of nonrefoulement. Accordingly, while human rights law widens threshold eligibility for
protection, the Convention remains the blueprint for rights and legal status.548
This thesis followed the foregoing reasoning by defining complementary international
protection as a corpus of obligations which widen the scope of international refugee law
with the objective of making it complete, that is encompassing all situations where
individuals find themselves unprotected by their state of nationality or residence. In
reality, this translates as non-specific human rights instruments being applied to the
context of refugee protection. Presuming that states have a positive duty to prevent and
sanction violations of human rights within their jurisdiction, an inability or unwillingness
of the state to do so puts individuals in a situation where they may literally be called
―persons in need of protection‖.
My method involved investigating what recourses exist when a state is unable or
unwilling to protect different types of rights. This served to highlight situations where a
basis for protection was created outside of the Refugee Convention, situations where
rights were used for the interpretation of the Convention itself, as well as situations where
international organizations create initiatives to guarantee the fulfilment of human rights.
The only source of protection which has sufficient independence from the Refugee
Convention to be deemed a separate and complementary protection mechanism is the
prohibition of non-refoulement in article 3 of CAT. Its embodiment in Canadian law, in
section 97 of IRPA, does not mention either this article of the CAT or the principle of
non-refoulement, thus avoiding the explicit integration of those peremptory norms. It
expresses a clear integration of the prohibition of torture by including most elements of
548
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article 1 of CAT and expanding it to include cruel, inhuman or unusual treatment or
punishment as well, in accordance with article 7 ICCPR.
Section 97 of IRPA links the category of persons in need of protection to the same
exclusions that are contained in the refugee definition, in article 1(E) and (F) of the
Refugee Convention, and leaves them subject to numerous grounds of inadmissibility at
the frontier, all of which go against the absolute nature of the principle of nonrefoulement. An analysis of case law has shown consensus that non-refoulement is
implicit within section 97 of IRPA, that it is indeed absolute, and that the CAT prevails
over the Refugee Convention. However, courts have sought to justify the exclusions and
the effective preference for the Refugee Convention over the CAT, instead of reassessing
IRPA‘s validity in light of international law.
With regards to civil and political rights that influence the interpretation of the refugee
definition and the principle of non-refoulement, most can be integrated within the
meaning of persecution in the Convention definition. However, Canadian law does not
respect the provisions relating to territorial access in the ICCPR and the Refugee
Convention, as its admissibility requirements allow for rejection of claimants at the
frontier on the basis of health or criminality grounds, without proper weighing of the risk
the claimant faces. If the risk is torture or cruel punishment, it goes against the principle
of non-refoulement. This thesis has also shown that the unwillingness to provide health
care may be accepted as grounds for protection, but the exclusion in cases of inability to
provide health care, and the public health exclusion at the frontier also go against the
absolute nature of non-refoulement.
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In relation to other social and economic rights, Canadian law does not provide a clear
framework of protection for situations where national disasters undermine individuals‘
ability to provide for their basic needs, unless a breakdown in infrastructure causes civil
and political unrest. In such cases, Canada may consider individuals to be persons ―in a
similar situation‖ to refugees and accept them through its humanitarian assistance
program, based on recommendations by the UNHCR. Also, the Supreme Court has
explicitly rejected natural disasters as persecution in the Ward case by essentially placing
their victims on the same level as people who merely seek a higher standard of living.
This thesis has also posed the question of longer-term concerns for the development of
minority cultures and the ability to earn a livelihood through non-discrimination in
education, which have been shown to hold little weight in protection claims. Despite
limits to the humanitarian character of the Canadian asylum system, it has generally
welcomed guidelines which take the interests of families, children and women into
account. Overall, these aspects of the Canadian implementation of international law could
be criticized for not being generous enough, but this thesis has also shown that responses
to these rights are not yet fully developed within international law itself.
This thesis generally aimed at exploring the general meaning of ―persons in need of
protection‖ within international law, and has demonstrated that it encompasses victims of
the breakdown of states‘ ability to protect their residents‘ and nationals‘ basic human
rights. In Canadian legislation, the expression has come to identify a more limited group
of persons. Although other measures provide some additional protection, they generally
appear as a pale reflection of the evolution of Refugee law in light of the development in
human rights law, in large part because they are hindered by numerous exclusions and
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their overall complexity. Complementary protection is still a concept under development,
but its emergence shows how wide-ranging and idealistic rights can become meaningful
and enforceable in a specific area of law. Its Canadian implementation, though limited,
adds to the growing international support for the existence of complementary protection
mechanisms and solidifies their recognition as international customary norms.
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